
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Foreign Minister Johanes Addresses Vienna CSCE Meeting

AU2001182689 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 19 Jan 89 p 6

[CTK Vienna dispatch: "Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs' Speech in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—Jaromir Johanes, CSSR minister of foreign affairs and leader of the CSSR delegation, addressed the closing session of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting on Wednesday [18 January].

By way of introduction, he conveyed thanks to the Austrian hosts for the very good conditions they established for the entire Vienna follow-up meeting and for its closing session. He went on to say:

On behalf of the Czechoslovak Government I want to welcome the successful conclusion of the meeting and the adoption of the final document, which is the outcome of positive will, realism, and new approaches to the problems of the present-day world. We appreciate the joint efforts made in drawing up the final document and, in particular, the constructive role of the neutral and nonaligned countries.

The document is proof of the viability and strength of the CSCE process. It further develops the Helsinki Final Act and creates prerequisites for all-European cooperation to be upgraded to a new, qualitatively higher level. It is not only an expression of the improving international atmosphere but, at the same time, it is also a contribution to the enhancement of positive tendencies in world developments.

Our country and all our people welcome and actively support the improvement in East-West and Soviet-American relations. The lessening of tension expands the scope for practical solutions to problems, for cooperation. The implementation of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, including the withdrawal and liquidation of missiles sited on Czechoslovak territory, has launched the process of actual disarmament. In the sphere of chemical weapons, too, a promising step was recently taken in Paris toward an early conclusion of a convention on their prohibition and liquidation. Progress has also been made in the search for ways to settle regional conflicts.

All this bears out that the influence of new political thinking, which proceeds from the realities of the nuclear age, from the priority of universal human values, and from the need to seek a balance of interests, is increasingly gaining ground in international relations.

The Need for New Approaches

However, it is necessary to intensify joint efforts to overcome some lingering stereotypes of old thinking and to ensure the irreversibility of positive developments. This is why we highly assess the fact that in the adopted document the participating states express their resolve to develop the present favorable changes in international relations and to reinforce the guarantees of peace and security.

The present situation makes it possible, and necessary, to fully exploit the wide-ranging potentials hidden in the Helsinki process and to undertake energetic efforts so that the comprehensive development of this process may further enrich the humanistic traditions of our continent; so that it may strengthen and promote the principles of all-European cooperation; ensure respect for the inalienable right of every nation to freely choose and develop its system; and contribute to the building of a non-nuclear and non-violent world, to the creation of comprehensive security by political means, and to the assertion of the primacy of international law in interstate relations.

It is precisely such approaches that need to be applied in Europe at the turn of the second and third milleniums as the trend toward the integration and interdependence of contemporary world makes itself more noticeably felt and as the internationalization of all spheres of international life increasingly gathers momentum. The need is becoming inevitable to unite the spiritual wealth, forces, and resources of all participants in the all-European process in tackling the problems of the time. Our aim must be a common European home, in the foundations of which will be deposited all the positive experiences gained on the road that was mapped out in Helsinki. In building it, the processes of democratization, demilitarization, and humanization of international relations will have to be developed. The point is to make the peoples of the European countries feel the efforts being made in this regard as soon as possible in their everyday lives. Precisely this should be the aim of the CSCE follow-up events upon which we have agreed in Vienna.

The peaceful restructuring of international relations requires realistic and bold approaches, Minister Johanes went on to say. The Soviet Union's innovative foreign policy is a source of inspiration in this regard. This is graphically demonstrated by the wide-ranging response aroused by the comprehensive program of strengthening political dialogue and solving urgent problems of the present time declared by the highest Soviet representative, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the United Nations. The unilateral measures of the Soviet Union to reduce armed forces and weaponry, which significantly reinforce mutual trust and create a favorable situation for progress in the sphere of conventional disarmament in Europe, have rightly gained high appreciation. The interests of security on our continent make it imperative that these steps be followed.

Czechoslovakia's Active Contribution

Czechoslovakia's active contribution to the realization of the idea of the common European home is the proposal to establish a zone of confidence, cooperation, and goodneighborly relations along the line of contact between Warsaw Pact and NATO states, put forward by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee. We are pleased that this proposal is being received with interest, while its comprehensive character is appreciated at the same time. This creates the necessary scope for constructive dialogue. Our proposal organically fits into the CSCE framework. We regard it as one of the instruments for a creative implementation of the conclusions, at which we have jointly arrived in developing this process. The joint proposals of the CSSR and the GDR to create a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe also remain fully relevant.

The meeting we are just concluding has opened the path toward a new quality of military detente on the all-European scale. It has created undeniable prerequisites for the further reinforcement of mutual trust and stability and for lessening the danger of a military confrontation breaking out.

The talks on conventional armed forces in Europe on the basis of the approved mandate will soon become a major practical test of the political will to achieve genuine progress in this direction. It is necessary to consistently see to it at the new forum that the phenomena of stagnation, which used to divert previous disarmament talks into blind alleys, are not repeated.

Together with our allies in the Warsaw Pact we believe that it would be expedient to begin with the removal of asymmetries, continue with substantial cuts in armed forces, and eventually achieve a situation in which the military potentials of both alliances would assume an exclusively defensive character and the possibility of a sudden attack would be ruled out. All this would have a far-reaching impact on the enhancement of stability and security in Europe, provided, of course, that all steps in this direction will be taken under strict supervision, that the balance of forces will not be disrupted, or the security of any country endangered.

We trust that full use of the new possibilities will be made also at the further talks of the 35 participating states on confidence-building measures and security in Europe. We advocate the further development of the measures agreed upon in Stockholm, with the application of which we have had good experience, and, at the same time, we also advocate the adoption of new significant steps. [passage omitted]

The CSSR has always belonged to those countries that are striving to consistently implement and creatively develop the Helsinki process. The expansion of a comprehensive dialogue and of mutual relations with states participating in the CSCE is one of the basic directions of our foreign policy.

We are convinced that the final document represents a striking landmark in the development of broad cooperation on our continent. We are striving for a Europe in which nations would live in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust. We trust that the implementation of the conclusions adopted at the Vienna meeting will bring us striking progress on the road of consolidating peace, security, and detente not only in Europe, but throughout the world. Czechoslovakia is prepared to turn these conclusions into reality, by creative collaboration with other participating states.

Results of Vienna CSCE Meeting Applauded

AU2401141189 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 21 Jan 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Accord in Vienna"]

[Text] The Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting has ended. The date of 19 January 1989—when the foreign ministers of the 35 signatory states to the Helsinki Final Act solemnly wound up the final session—will go down as another important milestone in the history of building a common European home.

It is precisely the Vienna final document that is of fundamental importance for the further development of the process of deepening all-European security and cooperation. RUDE PRAVO has already cited its fundamental ideas. In the next 4 years, a total of 11 [number as published] follow-up activities will influence the atmosphere on our continent: three conferences on human rights, a symposium on cultural heritage, a forum on information, a meeting on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, talks on a peaceful settlement of conflicts; in particular, the talks on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals; a forum on confidence- and security-building measures; and, finally, the fourth follow-up meeting in 1992.

As one can see, there is a respectable set of decisions and activities which should help to develop cooperation in Europe and increase confidence among states, a truly broad program for all-European cooperation in all spheres.

The reaching of an agreement on beginning as early as 6 March of this year, two follow-up deliberations in parallel in Vienna—the talks on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals involving the 23 signatory states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the forum of all 35 signatory states to the Helsinki Final Act on confidence- and security-building measures—is of first-rate importance.

The two forums will be held in the same place at the same time. This will facilitate the continuity and the interconnections. Thus, representatives of the remaining 12 states that are not members of both military-political groupings—that is, the nonaligned and the neutral countries, which have already more than once positively

influenced negotiations, the last time at the Vienna follow-up meeting—will have their say on conventional disarmament. In this way, the adopted decision only underscores the efforts for a Europe-wide dimension of the disarmament process. And precisely these two forums constitute the core, the foundation of the further course toward a more secure continent.

The question could arise: Who actually has won in Vienna—the West or the East? However, for quite some time now the developments in Europe, and not only in Europe, are not being viewed as the victory of one or the other side. The fact is that, by the adoption of the document, all those who live on this continent have gained, in the first place, a victory for Europe's benefit, for our benefit.

The road to the final document was complex. And again—as so often during recent international deliberations—a realistic approach toward international affairs and the method of compromise were successful here. Not by coincidence. The fact that, in the end, the participating countries—one, and then a second, or a third—managed to downgrade their demands a bit and raise the all-European interests higher, above their own, is the consequence and at the same time the result of the assertion of the new political thinking in practice, in international life. To put it concisely: an emerging awareness that we all live in a common home, and that one will be able to breathe better there when together we begin to eliminate the imaginary powder keg on which this home stands. No matter whether this keg takes the form of nuclear or conventional weapons, or pollution of the environment....

The success in Vienna is also a consequence of the fact that we have learned to understand one another better, that we know one another better. And this knowledge also yields trust. Only a few years ago, someone who considered it possible that one side would demonstrate its most modern strategic bomber, for example, to other side, that journalists' cameras would be clicking on military firing ranges, would be regarded, to say the least, as a hopeless dreamer. What looked impossible only yesterday is a reality today, and this reflects the shift in international relations.

The "Vienna accord," as Mikhail Gorbachev has called that common unifying feature, cannot be perceived separately or divorced from the general trend in international relations. The accord in Vienna and the adopted final document are the consequence of a process which is far broader, far more general, and more long-term than the mere 27 months of the Vienna deliberations.

This process had already begun with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Even though the all-European process of detente underwent a whole number of reversals, precisely in the past 4 years it acquired a new strength, upsurge, and energy. Therefore, the Vienna meeting also shook the "Iron Curtain," eroded its rusty construction, made further cracks in it, accelerated its corrosion, and became a new milestone on the road to a qualitatively new state of Europe.

Certainly, one did not succeed in everything. For example, the economic aspects of European cooperation remained a considerably peripheral issue, and the results in that connection could only be described as "modest," for most of the trash of the old confrontational approach has remained here.

A respectable piece of work was done in Vienna, which has strengthened the foundations of the European home. But the work on this continues and will continue. The adopted final document creates the necessary prerequisites for this.

However, in order for work to continue successfully and with new dynamism, on the last day of the final session of the Vienna follow-up meeting the Soviet Union came forward with further initiatives. The idea to convene an all-European summit meeting, which would be attended by all signatories to the Helsinki Final Act, can be regarded as the most important. It proceeds from the Soviet belief that, after a certain time, the extent of the deliberations on disarmament in Europe will urgently require deliberations conducted by the highest representatives.

The lights in the congress hall of the Austria Center have gone out. The solemn moments of the final session will now be supplanted by strenuous work to implement the document. Only at first glance does this look like normal, everyday work, because its goal is uncommon: a more secure Europe.

Statement on Chemical Weapons Verification

LD2601193689 Prague CTK in English
1740 GMT 26 Jan 89

[Text] Prague Jan 26 (CTK)—"We have an extraordinary interest in a speedy completion of the draft text of an agreement on general and complete ban on chemical weapons and on their liquidation which is being worked out at the Geneva disarmament conference," spokesman for the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Ivan Kulhanek said in a statement today.

Czechoslovakia has voiced its readiness to take part in a series of control experiments that would be aimed at finding the way to reliably control civilian chemical production and ensure that it could not be abused for the production of chemical weapons, the spokesman said.

In this context a number of concrete measures has been worked out and adopted on the basis of which experimental control of non-use of civilian industry for the production of chemical weapons was carried out in Czechoslovakia on the national level January 25-26. It

was successfully carried out in the state enterprise "Association for Chemical and Metallurgical Production Usti nad Labem—plant Mnisek" in the Liberec District. This plant in northern Bohemia produces chemicals for textile and leather industries.

"Experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Chemical Industry confirmed that an effective control in the civilian chemical industry was possible and practicable. It poses no serious obstructions to the production process nor threat to production or commercial secrets. Czechoslovakia will inform the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva through its diplomats. Later a similar experiment is to take place with the participation of foreign inspectors," Ivan Kulhanek said.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Honecker to Swedish Prime Minister on Conventional Forces Cuts

LD2301162489 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1446 GMT 23 Jan 89

[Text] [No dateline as received] On the occasion of the official dinner given on Monday [23 January] in honor of Ingvar Carlsson, prime minister of the Republic of Sweden, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, gave the following toast:

Allow me, Mr Prime Minister, once again, to cordially welcome you and your esteemed spouse as well as your entourage to the GDR. It is a great pleasure for me that, after the meeting with the unforgotten Olof Palme 5 years ago and our meeting in Stockholm in 1986, we can continue our dialogue concerning questions affecting people today. This dialogue is based on goodneighborliness; it is of a confidence-building nature.

Since we last spoke, there have been important changes in the international arena. Securing peace, continuing the process of disarmament, and replacing confrontation with cooperation have moved more than ever into the focus of world interest.

We note with satisfaction the change introduced for improving international relations. Our two countries and peoples have made active contributions in this regard. Together with all forces of reason and realism, we are now working to push through detente, peace, and disarmament everywhere in the world and to finally make it irreversible.

In line with agreements made, the destruction of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles has began as a significant first step toward real nuclear disarmament. It has been confirmed: where there is a will there is a way. Now it is important to make further strides with just as much constructive will. Here I am thinking of the nuclear area, but also of chemical weapons and conventional disarmament. The objective should be to exclude for all time a return to a policy of confrontation and rearmament.

The German Democratic Republic makes a comprehensive contribution to the implementation of the joint peace strategy of the Warsaw Pact member states. We completely support the new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union to improve the international situation which were announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR's highest representative, to the 43d UN General Assembly in New York.

The unilateral withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces from GDR territory planned in this connection is to take place in close consultation between our governments. In this regard, I can inform you that concerning the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR the following is foreseen.

Before the end of 1989: The 25th Tank Division, The 32d Tank Division, two independent tank training regiments, and eight independent battalions are to be withdrawn.

In 1990: The 7th Tank Division, the 12th Tank Division, the Air Assault Brigade, three training regiments, including a tank training regiment, and three independent battalions are to be withdrawn.

The mechanized infantry and tank divisions of the Soviet Army remaining on our territory will, during these 2 years, be given a still more marked defensive character.

Guided by the endeavor to make a further constructive contribution to the disarmament process, which should be continued without pause, and to show goodwill and the preparedness to reduce the armed forces and conventional armaments through deeds, and in the hope of giving other European states food for thought, the GDR National Defense Council has decided:

1. The National People's Army of the GDR will, unilaterally and independent of negotiations, be reduced by 10,000 men.

2. Linked to this major reduction in personnel strength of the National People's Army are

—the disbandment of 6 tank regiments,

—the reduction of 600 tanks which will be converted for industrial purposes or scrapped,

—the disbandment of an air squadron, and

—the decommissioning of 50 fighter aircraft.

3. At the same time, national defense expenditures will be reduced by 10 percent.

4. These reduction measures are to be concluded by the end of 1990 and the GDR National People's Army will be restructured in such a way that it will have a still more strictly defensive character.

In accordance with its historic responsibility and its humanistic task, our socialist state acts according to the maxim that everything must be done to ensure that never again will war emanate from German soil, but only peace. We view this task as one that goes beyond the vital interest of our own people and extends into a far-reaching dimension. Peace and security are necesary today for the existence of all mankind. In view of the danger of a nuclear inferno and after the devastations brought on by two world wars in our century, this recognition is gaining more and more ground, especially in Europe.

The CSCE process is an expression of this. This successful conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting has created favorable preconditons for its deepening in all spheres of the Helsinki Final Act. Now the objective is to implement what has been agreed upon in the spirit of the strengthening of stability of the CSCE process, and the strengthening of peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation. We regard it as particularly important that the path be clear for a negotiating forum of 23 states, which will seek agreemer ts on the raduciton of conventional armed forces and armaments. Confidence- and security-building measures will be further developed.

When one speaks about promoting the disarmament process, then a number of problems must be mentioned that require a priority solution. I refer to the halving of the strategic nuclear weapon potentials of the USSR and the United States while adhering strictly to the ABM Treaty, the gradual stop to all nuclear weapons tests, the ban and destruction of all chemical weapons, the drastic reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We assess the call by nearly all the participants in the Paris conference for the immediate conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive ban of chemical weapons as a demand to at last get down to business in Geneva. As a state at the dividing line between the two most powerful military organizations, the GDR emphatically advocates that the tactical nuclear weapons on European soil be included in the disarmament process and their modernization be prevented. All initiatives calculated to reduce military confrontation and to consolidate stability and confidence will have our support. As is known we have presented our own proposals to this end.

We are fully convinced that nuclear as well as chemical weapon-free zones and corridors could represent solid first steps on the path toward global solutions. Therefore, we support the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in northern Europe, in the Balkans, and in other regions. We have already agreed to the Swedish proposal to create a corridor in central Europe free of theater nuclear forces.

We appreciate those impulses emanating from the neutral and nonaligned states and their movement. Here I would like to pay tribute to your personal commitment in the six-state-initiative, Mr Prime Minister. I also affirm our sympathy for the active work of Swedish diplomacy in solving complicated international issues.

The fact that the world can view the future full of hope, in spite of continuing worries, is thanks also to the positive tendency of a peaceful solution in international centers of conflict. Thus the growing role of the United Nations, which also includes the active participation of Sweden in peace-preserving measures in the world organization, become apparent. Congratulations on the bestowal of the Nobel Peace Prize to the UN peace-keeping forces are, quite rightly, also addressed to your country.

During today's talks we were pleased to establish complete agreement in the assessment of the relations between our states, and could draw a good balance. Mutual interest is growing and is stimulting a manifold exchange in all areas.

Political dialogue is bearing fruit. In this, the high degree of agreement on the vital questions facing mankind, on the averting of a nuclear inferno, on disarmament and detente, has a confidence-encouraging nature over and above the bilateral framework. We are making a weighty contribution to the common European home through exemplary relations of peaceful coexistence.

Trade and economic cooperation have always occupied an important position in our relations. We can state with satisfaction that the program for the development of trade and economic relations between our countries, signed on the occasion of my state visit to Sweden in June 1986, is being implemented successfully. Impressive confirmation of this is the considerable increase in mutual trade, including extensive construction work, in the period 1986-88.

The GDR will continue to do everything possible to guarantee the extension and deepening of economic cooperation and to develop it for the long-term. We are convinced that the continuous development of foreign trade relations between our countries contributes effectively to promoting peaceful cooperation, counteracting worldwide endeavors hostile to detente, and to further consolidating goodneighborly relations.

The friendship of our people for their northern neighbors grows not least from the humanist traditions and intellectual-cultural spheres of contact our peoples have produced in a history of over 1,000 years. Names such as those of the reformer, Olaus Petri; the representative of

GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, 65, posed as the immaculate German. "We do not have any chemical weapons," he claimed at the Paris chemical weapons conference the week before last, "we do not develop them, and we do not store them." Hidden by a blue and white globe on the rostrum, he called for the "complete elimination of chemical weapons"—for "the survival of mankind."

The strongest applause came from the seventh row, where the nine-member GDR delegation sat. In the spacious conference hall of the Paris UNESCO building new proof of international hypocrisy had been given.

There has long been sufficient evidence of the fact that the other German state is also making money in the dirty business with chemical mass destruction means. Domestic and foreign intelligence services, international arms dealers, and statements by a former GDR lieutenant, which are available to DER SPIEGEL, confirm how intensively the GDR is participating in international chemical-weapons armament.

Thus, in 1984 Iraqi businessman Ihsan Barbouti negotiated with the VEB Light Metal Construction Combine in Plauen about the delivery of 10,800 tonnes of steel constructions for a "Technology Center" near Tripoli. FRG companies were not able to undercut the cheap offer from the East bloc. Like the capitalist companies from the West, the GDR also delivered equipment to Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi for the "Pharma 150" in Al-Rabitah.

The fact that the civilian materials serve totally different purposes was probably recognized early by the GDR intelligence services. In 1987 the GDR tightened its export regulations for chemicals, which can be used "both for peaceful purposes and for the production of weapons" (Foreign Minister Fischer).

In chemical-weapons research, which has always been denied officially, the GDR belongs to the world's best. Even the Military Service Office of the Bundeswehr in Munster, Lower Saxony, which is responsible for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, is working with a 1,100-page "Textbook of Military Chemistry" from East Berlin. Since former GDR scientist Adolf-Hening Frucht, 75, revealed the East's secret research into combat agents (DER SPIEGEL No 24-28/1978), Western intelligence services have been following the East bloc's chemical-weapons armament more intensively. What the Soviets once called the "fantasies of a madman" is now confirmed by a former lieutenant of the National People's Army (NVA), who himself learned to handle chemical agents in the GDR: According to his own statements, Ulrich Bergemann, who has lived near Darmstadt since his expulsion in 1984, had access to strictly guarded research departments for years as a lab assistant.

In his work contract with the VEB Pharmaceutical Works, Dresden, he had to pledge "strictest secrecy"—for obvious reasons. His workplace in work section 101 of the branch enterprise in Radebeul, Wilhelm-Pieck-Strasse 35, was located in a prohibited area. In laboratory 14, accessible only with an identification card marked in black, "nitrogen analyses for the military-medical section" were carried out. In laboratories 1 and 2 the pharmaceutical researchers worked on "phosphorus-organic compounds" for "psychological-toxic combat agents."

According to a NATO report published in 1985, 15,000 scientists in the Warsaw Pact have been working for "basic research for chemical weapons" for 30 years—for instance in the GDR Bitterfeld Chemical Combine, in the VEB Fahlberg List, Magdeburg, and in the VEB Fluorine Works near Pirna. There Bergemann saw how the National People's Army picked up sodiumfluoride, the basic chemical substance for the nerve poison Sarin, in a tank wagon.

In a flat-roofed building, in work section 106, the GDR researchers tested various combat agents on cats, dogs, and guinea-pigs. Glass ampules, filled with Sarin, were shot into the test cells with a catapult, Bergemann says.

Bergemann's zeal was worthwhile. He had already been asked when he was drafted whether "in view of his special knowledge" he did not want to serve "in a special unit." At the Nuclear Physics Central Institute in Rossendorf he had passed the examination and was rated as a skilled worker. The judgment: "good talents and good intellectual grasp."

He registered with the "people's riot police," which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, and was called in to ward off "internal unrest" and to "protect individuals."

According to Bergemann, at the Radeberg "Noncommissioned Officers School," he was instructed in dealing with gas warfare agents. The equipment of the people's police includes tear gas and eye irritants, as it does in the West. "Irritant grenades" were fired from rifle barrels. The smoke candles used were still partly marked with an imperial eagle. Old chemical agents from World War II are "processed in laboratories" (Bergemann) in the GDR. Bergemann said that mustard gas and Tabun grenades of a 75mm caliber had to be refilled for bigger launchers of the Soviet forces.

In the National People's Army, Bergemann later received "thorough military-chemical training." His paratroop unit, No 509, in Prora, on the island of Ruegen, was drilled in close combat for action in the enemy hinterland, for the guerrilla-like elimination of guards, and for blowing up bridges. In simulated acts of

sabotage against drinking water systems, chemical poison was used, Bergemann says. Because handling explosive material was also expected, Bergemann passed an additional examination to become a blaster: "a lively unit."

In the eastern Soviet Union, unit 509 was trained in cold weather operations. At temperatures of between 30 and 35 degrees below zero, the GDR soldiers were trained for 3 and ½ weeks in the use of "tactical mixtures." The freezing point of chemical agents can be lowered by special liquids. The advantage: Even U.S. missile stations in Alaska can be neutralized by a surprise chemical attack.

Near the Siberian city of Tomsk, the "elimination" of an enemy missile basis was rehearsed. To this end, the Soviet Army as the supposed enemy had built—and finally blew up—lifelike dummies of the U.S. "Honest John" missile. Even NATO weapons such as the German G3 rifle or antitank grenade launcher 44 were used. With chemical agent indicator KZ1a, the lethal gas could be sprayed even at extremely low temperatures.

On the other hand, exercises at extremely high temperatures were carried out in desertlike areas in Kazakhstan in the summer. At this time of the year, the chemical agents were mixed with rubberlike additives to achieve longer adhesion and durability.

In military exercises in the GDR, Bergemann learned about even more dangerous chemical agents. In a training area, a senior officer presented a new tactical mixture which was declared top secret. In addition, the chemical agent trichlortriethylamin had been exposed to radiation in a nuclear reactor.

The effects are devastating, because the outer symptoms of radiation contamination are comparable to those of chemical agents and cannot initially be recognized by the potential victims.

Bergemann claims that he also witnessed the application of these chemical agents in the open field. He says that in 1968 the combat troops sprayed the devilish stuff in Daebener Heide near Leipzig. Equipped with protective suits, mobile field laboratories, Geiger counters, and dosimeters, they measured chemical-nuclear contaminations. The betanuclides decomposed only after several days, Bergemann says: "total madness."

In contrast, the use of flamethrowers seems to be almost harmless. Effective incendiary agents such as the gray-brown napalm allegedly form part of the GDR forces' chemical warfare. Even though the use of napalm against civilians has been internationally banned since the Vietnam war, GDR soldiers in flamethrowing units have learned how to produce effective incendiary mines. According to Bergemann, simple tin barrels, filled with napalm and splinter mines, are being hidden in the ground along the frontline.

During National People's Army reserve exercises near Frankfurt/Oder, Bergemann witnessed in a reconnaissance unit for the last time in 1980 how soldiers were harassed by their superior with eye irritants, when the gas alert was given in the early morning: "Get out of your pajamas, and into the gas masks."

In the GDR the basic equipment of military units includes a pack of blue, yellow, black, or green counterinjections for various chemical agents. According to NATO findings, special ventilating systems in the Warsaw Pact army vehicles protect the troops against nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological contamination.

In 1984, Ulrich Bergemann, who meanwhile had become an attorney and regime critic, was expelled. He was deprived of the rank of National People's Army lieutenant.

However, Western intelligence services did not make use of his knowledge in interrogations. A certain "General Agency for Interrogations," Mainz branch office, invited Bergemann for an interview, in order to collect "reliable information for the federal government about other countries."

The former National People's Army officer met with intelligence people in Mainz five times. Then he was supposed to visit the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) headquarters in Pullach near Munich "for several days." However, that did not come about.

Bergemann, who had found a job with a construction materials firm, feared that he would get into trouble with his chief, because he would have again had to ask for compensation for lost earnings [verdienstausfall]. He did not go to Munich—and the BND did not get important information.

HUNGARY

Foreign Ministry Reports on Chemical Weapons Verification Test

AU1901101089 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 17 Jan 89 p 1

["vil"-signed report]

[Text] Budapest (our correspondent)—In answering a question posed by our correspondent in Budapest, a press spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic has said that tests carried out by experts of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Industry, and Commerce at the Hungarian Chinoin pharmaceutical enterprise were successful and proved that the control of the production of substances that could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons is verifiable in the course of the production process within national frameworks. The test was carried out in response to a Soviet proposal.

Foreign Minister Varkonyi Addresses Vienna CSCE Conference

LD1801183189 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[MTI-attributed speech by Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi at the CSCE conference in Vienna on 18 January, under the headline: "The Hungarian Foreign Minister's Speech at the Vienna Closing Conference—The Existence of Military Blocs Contradicts the Requirements of All-European Development."]

[Text] Mr President! Your Excellencies!

Let me first convey greetings from the government and the public of Hungary to all participants at this meeting. I would like to extend our thanks to the Government of the Republic of Austria and the citizens of Vienna for their hospitality and the excellent conditions they have provided for our deliberations. Let me also thank the staff of the Executive Secretariat for their devoted work throughout the Vienna meeting.

It is a particular pleasure for me to note that contacts and cooperation between Austria and Hungary for the success of the Vienna follow-up meeting has become a valuable part of our traditional goodneighborly relations. For us, this time again, it has borne out convincingly the importance of bilateral relations in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

More than 2 years ago, at the opening session of the meeting, I expressed the hope and expectation that Vienna become a milestone in the evaluation of the CSCE process and this follow-up meeting result in improving qualitatively the conditions for security and cooperation in Europe.

Has the Vienna meeting lived up to our expectations? The answer is definitely in the affirmative.

The successful outcome has been greatly facilitated by the favorable shift on the international scene. During the past 2 years, a new trend in international relations has gathered momentum and become a determinant factor. It implies a growing awareness of the interdependence and mutual interests of states and peoples. The increasing recognition of shared responsibility has set in motion the process of nuclear disarmament and of seeking negotiated solutions for regional hotbeds of crises. The priority of universal human values and the need to build interstate relations freed from ideological biases are becoming new standards in international politics. The feindbild [German: hostile image] based on cold war reflexes is on the wane. The policy of openness and the mutual search for cooperation patterns has had a favorable impact on the fabric of interstate relations, particularly in Europe.

The power of a shared interest in developing all-European cooperation is convincingly demonstrated by the success of the 35 participants in elaborating a substantive agreement. It was done by strenuous efforts and by bringing often diametrically opposed positions closer together. The Vienna final document will enable us to make balanced progress in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in all walks of cooperation.

I wish to express our sincere appreciation to the neutral and nonaligned states as well as to the coordinators of negotiations for their efforts in elaborating the final document and in facilitating the successful outcome of the meetings.

The Vienna agreement is, in our view, the most important document of the CSCE process since the signature of the Helsinki Final Act. It is a means of bringing about a real qualitative breakthrough in the Helsinki process. The document reflects the positive changes that have taken place in Europe since the Madrid meeting, and launches a long-term program of dynamic action on both national and all-European levels.

It indicates a new approach that the Vienna final document lays emphasis on practical measures and the precise formulation of commitments and guarantees for their implementation. The document properly implies the demand of the participating states to keep under review one another's compliance with obligations. This is supported by the mechanisms created for verification of implementation, in addition to the security aspects, in the field of human rights and humanitarian commitments as well. I would reconfirm that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has the resolute intention of implementing all stipulations of the Vienna final document, and expects all other participating states to do the same.

As one of the major results of the Vienna meeting, the issues of the human dimension have become an area of real cooperation and specific commitments for the participating states. The tone of confrontations has abated, and recriminations have been progressively replaced by a meaningful dialogue even on delicate details of human rights and humanitarian issues. A more balanced perception has developed on civil and political as well as on social, economic, and cultural rights.

It is a favorable new development that a certain convergence could be observed in the positions of states belonging to different groups. The need to identify common interests has weakened the "bloc approach" which characterized the previous follow-up meetings. A number of proposals were co-sponsored by members of different groups of countries. It has also been realized that the implementation of CSCE commitments is a responsibility of all participating states, irrespective of their social system or alliance affiliation.

Progress has also been made in bringing the principles of sovereignty and non-interference into line with the current requirements and future needs of all-European cooperation. The idea that justified critical observations on failing implementation can be rejected, and compliance with obligations evaded, under the pretext of non-interference, has been isolated. The Vienna meeting has reaffirmed that compliance with agreed commitments cannot be an exclusively internal matter for participants. Domestic laws must not be at variance with the international obligations of states.

Similarly, the approach which demands implementation from other countries, but ignores implementation by one's own, have proved an unfeasible way for the future.

The agreement on the launching of parallel talks within the framework of the CSCE process on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and on confidence- and security-building measures is a result of outstanding importance for the future of all-European security and cooperation. These decisions are a reflection of the fact that conventional disarmament, strengthening confidence in connection with the military aspects of security, and a substantial reduction in the current high level of military confrontation has become a central task in Europe. The existence of overtrized opposing military forces with offensive capabilities are inconsistent with the requirements of the new stage in the CSCE process.

Setting into motion the process of radical cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe by eliminating the existing asymmetries and the capabilities of launching surprise attacks and large-scale offensives, and by elaborating reliable measures for verification, is a highly important task of the conventional disarmament talks. It is a fundamental security and political interest of all European states that the process of disarmament, begun with disarmament steps by the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states, should, at a later stage, be extended to embrace all participating states.

I wish to reaffirm that the Hungarian People's Republic has a vested interest in the success of conventional disarmament talks. We intend to actively contribute to the progress of those talks, to be held in the spirit of the documents accepted in the course of the CSCE process. The recent agreements on arms limitation and confidence-building support our hope that we will achieve genuine results by the next CSCE follow-up meeting, making full use of the advantages stemming from the CSCE framework of talks, without curbing their autonomy.

all-European interests. This is proven by the announcement at the UN Organization by Mikhail Gorbachev on the major unilateral reduction in Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe, which was welcomed and supported by the Hungarian side. The unilateral move by the Soviet Union justified our frequently repeated standpoint on the necessity for unilateral measures, their value and impulse, and their favorable political effect.

Given the positive experience with the implementation of the Stockholm document, Hungary attaches paramount importance to the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures. The extension of the scope of existing measures and the elaboration of a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures would further increase confidence between states as well as the openness and transparency in the military domain. It would also supplement and facilitate progress in talks on conventional disarmament in Europe.

The Vienna final document addresses the issues of human rights and humanitarian contacts in accordance with the important role these questions play in improving cooperation and confidence among states. The document reflects the increased importance of this set of questions by substantially extending the scope of human rights and humanitarian obligations. Our approaches to these issues have come closer to one another. As a sign of this, the Vienna final document has widened the fields of cooperation stipulated in the final act by a mechanism of consultations and verification in the field of the human dimension. This is proof of the capability of the CSCE process to adapt itself to new international needs.

You are well aware that the Hungarian Government devotes particular attention to guaranteeing the individual and collective rights of national minorities. We are satisfied to note that this issue is coming more and more into the focus of European politics. The governments, public opinion, legislatures, and social organizations of participating states are following with greater attention the problems of national minorities. They are raising their voices against measures infringing on these rights.

The Vienna final document stipulates the duty of the participating states to guarantee the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to national minorities. Progress is represented by the document in extending the nationality rights to the fields of human contacts and information. At the same time, I do not conceal that we hoped to achieve even more in this issue of particular importance to us, among other things, in the recognition of collective rights of national minorities. I am convinced that the future development of the CSCE process will open up possibilities in this regard.

of the final document have always been a matter of priority for Hungary. We believe our efforts have also contributed to strengthening the cultural identity of Europe and increasing the confidence-building role of cultural exchanges and cooperation.

The recommendations of the final document on economic and trade relations, as well as scientific-technological and environmental cooperation, go beyond the relevant provisions of the Madrid final document in several respects. However, our cooperation could and should be widened in several fields. We think that the difference of economic systems and methods of economic management should encourage the exploration of untapped opportunities in an all-European framework. I would add that an economically sound Europe is in full compliance and indispensable for the security interests of all countries of Europe. Joint action in the economic field should be parallel and serve humanitarian cooperation, and by doing so contribute to strengthening the integrity of the CSCE process.

The Vienna final document provides a varied program, unprecedented in the CSCE process, for the period up to the next follow-up meeting to be held in Helsinki. The meetings and conferences of experts provide an appropriate framework for the fullest possible implementation of the accords reached at Vienna.

The participating states should hold bilateral and multilateral consultations before the events so as to find a new more efficient role in the CSCE process. There are many areas that have not yet been explored or which require further steps, for instance education and science. We must pay attention to these areas, and to other partial fields of action as well, which could further enrich the scale of our CSCE endeavors.

The profound economic and political reforms underway in Hungary, including the modernization of political institutions and the extension of democratic and human rights, and the establishment of a broad scale of constitutional and legal guarantees are in full accordance with the spirit and substance of the final document we are now adopting. I am convinced that the measures we will take to implement the Vienna final document will promote the implementation of our economic and social aims.

We are now entering a promising stage of development in all-European relations. Interstate cooperation has been intensified and given more substance. Relations between CEMA and the EEC have been institutionalized. Dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states is under way. Cooperation in Europe has been developing in various regional and sub-regional forms. Parallel to the processes of integration, there is a revival of development based on the distinctive features and national or ethnic identities of different regions. I am convinced that, among the mutually complementary forms and trends of European cooperation, the CSCE process continues to play a unique and indispensable role, serving as an overall framework and acting as a catalyst.

The process of cooperation set in motion by the Helsinki Final Act is an important means of building our common European home. Beyond the governments, the organizations and associations representing the general public and the individuals who are prepared to foster the CSCE ideals should also be become involved in this "building activity."

The ultimate objective of this process could be our common future, the establishment of a Europe, unified in its endeavors and values and free of divisions, which makes a stimulative effect with its multiformity.

The Vienna meeting marks the beginning of a new stage in this process. Making full use of the opportunities provided by the Vienna final document, we have a shared interest and possibility to turn the European dream into reality.

Thank You, Mr President!

Hungarian Representative Addresses UN Institute in Geneva

LD2301211189 Budapest MTI in English 1754 GMT 23 Jan 89

[Text] Geneva, January 23 (MTI)—The Hungarian People's Republic seeks to play an active and initiating role so that the talks to be launched on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe may yield success as soon as possible and the measures may be extended to Hungary in the very first phase, said Gyula Horn, state secretary of foreign affairs, who delivered a paper at the Geneva conference of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on Monday [23 January].

Mr Horn went on, 'The citizens of the European states welcomed the fact that talks on the disarmament of traditional weapons would soon start. They hope that the talks will lead away from a military confrontation and the balance of fear to genuine security based on political cooperation and the elimination of the material bases of military threat, and that the political, economic and psychological burdens stemming from the maintenance of large, regular armies will decrease. The unilateral Soviet disarmament steps announced by Mikhail Gorbachev on December 7, 1988, were of great importance from the aspect of the planned disarmament talks. The Soviet decision has envisaged measures that point far beyond quantitative reductions, and involve the first genuine steps towards a defence-oriented transformation of the military-technical side of the military doctrine'.

Mr Horn emphasized the need for taking a complex approach to military balance in Europe, considering the European armies as a whole, including the land and air forces.

The Hungarian state secretary emphasized that the balance of military power cannot be measured exclusively in figures. Taking the major qualitative differences between the arms systems into account, such an approach would necessarily lead to false conclusions. Power relations can only be assessed in the light of goals and conditions. As a result of historical development, the armed forces of the two military alliances developed under rather different patterns. In certain areas, the Warsaw Treaty member states offset their technical lag by quantitative development. A realistic assessment of the current situation makes it necessary to consider this fact, too.

'The negotiators should consider that some asymmetries could hardly be eliminated. The Western side is mainly concerned with the fact that the Soviet Union is a European state, which facilitates supply, while the United States is outside Europe. This is, however, partly compensated by some facts such as the obsolete infrastructure of Eastern Europe, and the considerable superiority of the NATO naval forces. At the same time, the NATO countries should accept that a considerable part of the Soviet air defence has tasks other than defence against cruise missiles and naval air forces deployed in Europe'.

Mr Horn emphasized that the disarmament measures to be elaborated in the talks would only be efficient if they comprised, in the first phase, central Europe as a whole. All ideas that ignored a part of this geographical region for one reason or other were doomed to failure.

Although the military cuts in Hungary did not influence central power relations directly, they had some importance and a symbolic value. They were suitable for demonstrating the possibility that the armed forces of a country belonging to an alliance system could be transformed into something non-offensive, under the new concept of security, Mr Horn said.

Defense Minister Karpati Discusses Soviet Troop Withdrawal Plans

Meets Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff

LD2501163189 Budapest MTI in English
1520 GMT 25 Jan 89

[Text] Budapest, January 25 (MTI)—Army General Anatoliy Gribkov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty united armed forces, in Hungary on a brief working visit since Tuesday evening, met Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, Minister of Defense, on Wednesday and held talks at the Ministry of Defense.

Details of Troop Withdrawal

LD2501170989 Budapest MTI in English
1646 GMT 25 Jan 89

[Text] Budapest, January 25 (MTI)—With the preparations completed, the schedule for the withdrawal of part of the troops, armaments and military technology of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary has been finalized. Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defense, informed the HUNGARIAN NEWS AGENCY about details on Wednesday.

He said that he had recently received a letter from Army General Dmitriy Yazov, Soviet defense minister, officially informing Hungary's leadership about what units are to be withdrawn from Hungarian territory, and at what pace. Accordingly, during the first half of this year, an armoured car division is to set off for home from Veszprem and vicinity, and an armoured car instructor regiment will also be removed. The second half of the year will see a parachute assault battalion and a fighter plane regiment from Tokol airport leaving Hungary, when a chemical defense battalion and the staff of Szolnok Officers' Military Academy depart.

Answering a question on concrete numerical data, Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati said that, although the details are known, what matters most is not the number of soldiers, but the fire-power and striking force of the weapons and war technology, including tanks, aircraft and parachute assault units.

The minister of defense also reported that the two headquarters are continuing talks about the future of evacuated facilities, and added that a few pending problems will also be solved. He said that, as an MP, he had been contacted by people anxious about the fate of a listed building near Esztergom Cathedral which has housed a Soviet military hospital for a long time. Now this building would also become vacant. The coordination talks are expected to offer an appropriate solution to the transfer of the smaller Soviet sub-unit accommodated in Grassalkovich Castle, Godollo.

The discussions will cover the fate of the facilities in Veszprem and Tokol. However, it can already be stated with certainty that both areas will become noticeably quieter, and the high noise level frequently, and justly, [word indistinct] to by the population will decrease. It is not certain whether all barracks to be vacated shortly will be handed over, as a reorganization of Soviet troops will be carried out in Hungary: various units will be regrouped, mainly from the western part of the country, Ferenc Karpati said in conclusion.

POLAND

Polish UN Envoy Presides Over Chemical Weapons Debate

LD1801120689 Warsaw PAP in English
0207 GMT 18 Jan 89

[Text] Geneva, Jan. 17—The committee for chemical weapons acting within the frame of the Disarmament Conference of 40 states began debates in Geneva today.

The debates are presided over by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, Poland's permanent representative to the U.N. European bureau in Geneva.

During a meeting with the press, Sujka stated that if there is a political will then one can also resolve complicated disarmament issues and the Paris conference has shown that such a will exists. Sujka also drew attention to that point of the Paris conference declaration which speaks about the need for the most expeditious solution of problems which still remain to be regulated with a view to finally elaborating a convention on a ban on chemical weapons.

General Szacilo Outlines Military Changes

Journalists Briefed

AU2501102989 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 21-22 Jan 89 p 5

[Report by Stanislaw Reperowicz: "General of Arms Tadeusz Szacilo Replies to Journalists' Questions: What Do the Changes in the Military Involve?"]

[Text] The military following the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum and public reaction to the interview given to the press by Army General Florian Siwicki, minister of National Defense, on the changes that are taking place in the Armed Forces (TRYBUNA LUDU 4 January) were the main subjects of a meeting between General of Arms Tadeusz Szacilo, head of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces, and members of the Military-Defense Journalism Club of the PPR Journalists Association, which took place at the House of the Journalist in Warsaw on 20 January.

One of the questions asked was about the reduction of expenditures on the Armed Forces and national defense and the component parts of the Ministry of National Defense's budget. General Szacilo pointed out that the defense budget will be reduced by 4 percent in 1989 and will amount to Z954 billion in absolute terms. This represents an annual burden of about Z25,000 on every citizen. These are not significant sums in the context of solving economic problems, but every zloty should be counted. In per capita terms, we spend less on defense than other states. We spend far less than the NATO countries and less than the Warsaw Pact states (with the exception of Romania).

The greater part of the budget is assigned for the purchase of weapons and equipment. It, too, will be significantly reduced. We will simply buy less weaponry abroad and from our own industry. This will yield a further benefit in that plants will be able to allocate more production capacity than at present for the manufacture of goods for general use. Military training accounts for another part of the budget. It is hoped that savings will be made in this area through the more extensive use of all kinds of substitute forms of equipment in training: training simulators are much cheaper than actual military materiel. In addition, it is also envisaged that fewer trips will be made to firing grounds. Expenditure on maintenance, that is—food, uniforms, and health—accounts for another element of the budget.

The military itself generates some of the funds used for defense. For example, last year Z30 billion were saved through the consistent implementation of the efficient administration system. The minister of National Defense transferred most of this amount to the state treasury. The work that the military performed for the national economy last year was worth Z90 billion. A further Z27 billion has to be added to this amount for the results achieved through the so-called non-budget economy. This is the amount that would have had to have been paid (according to prices at the beginning of the year) for the meat, grain, vegetables, and other foodstuffs that the military produced on farms attached to bases, on land on the edges of firing ranges, training grounds, and so on. Military scientists are also playing an increased role in solving various national economic problems.

In response to questions about the restructuring of the military, Army General Szacilo cited the example of transforming certain tactical units into so-called material and technical bases, which can be compared to a system of magazines that employ no more than the number of people needed to maintain equipment.

Journalists also asked about what should be understood by the slogan of introducing more human qualities into the Armed Forces. It means introducing qualitatively new elements into military organization and order. For example, more leave passes are being issued on an experimental basis. Changes are also being made to military regulations pertaining to internal service, discipline, garrison duty, and sentry duty. A special commission is examining various aspects of interpersonal relations, including the subordinate-superior relationship. It is a question of removing all burdensome aspects of service that are not essential for the maintenance of combat readiness.

One of the questions asked concerned defense doctrine. In describing it, General Szacilo said that four basic elements could be identified: acting in every possible way to prevent the outbreak of war; a conscious abandonment of offensive-type operations, which is synonymous with an abandonment of a first-strike policy; the maintenance of one's own armed forces solely at the level that is essential for defense purposes; and planning for the conduct of combat operations only on the territory of one's own country.

Journalists were also interested in the process of withdrawing part of the Soviet forces stationed in Poland, which was announced a few days ago by General Chervov. They were told that this was the result of agreements between the PPR Ministry of National Defense and the USSR Ministry of Defense.

During the meeting a large group of journalists, filmmakers, and journalism teachers received medals for "services performed for national defense."

Roundup of Press Comment on Defense Reductions

LD2401233989 Warsaw PAP in English 1640 GMT 23 Jan 89

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—As the RZECZPOSPOLITA daily reports, the budget of the Ministry of National Defence totals 954 billion zlotics.

"The budgets of other ministries are significantly higher. Last year the Ministry of National Defence decreased its expenditures by 4 percent and passed 30 billion Zlotics to the state treasury. The per capita expenditure burden in Poland totals [words indistinct] zloties annually and according to Swedish data 59.4 dollars. The same index has reached 1,128 dollars in the U.S., 303 in Canada, 474 in Great Britain, 532 in Norway, 521 in France," RZECZPOSPOLITA writes.

This data was made available on January 20 by the chief of the Main Political Board of the Polish Army, Gen. Tadeusz Szacilo at a meeting with members of the military-defence writers' club of the Association of Journalists of People's Poland.

Writing about this meeting, the TRYBUNA LUDU reported that "the greatest part of the military budget is earmarked for the purchase of armaments and military equipment. This part will decrease the most. Less weapons will simply have a double advantage because some factories will be able to allot a greater part of production capacities to the production of everyday-use commodities. The second portion of the budget falls to military training. Also here there is a will to achieve savings.

"One of the questions concerned the defence doctrine. Characterizing it, Gen. Szacilo stressed that one could distinguish four basic features in it: using all efforts to prevent an outbreak of war, conscious resignation from offensive operations which is equal to resignation from striking first, maintaining one's own armed forces at a level necessary only for defence, assuming that battles will be fought only on the territory of one's own country," TRYBUNA LUDU reports.

As SLOWO POWSZECHNE reports, "Gen. Szacilo also referred to the remunerations of the career military personnel which have come to be associated with numerous myths. He revealed that last December the average wage in industry totalled 111 thousand zloties and 73 thousand zloties in the Army (the highest remunerations in the Polish Army, those of the minister and vice ministers were lower than the average in the industry).

"Another question was what would happen to the career military. A part of these people will be appointed to other posts in the Army, a part to service outside the Army and a part to the reserve (including also in the accelerated procedure). As concerns regular conscripts, lowering of the conscription quota and earlier release are not excluded.

"As concerns savings in purchases, in recent years it was possible to avoid certain stages of re-arming. For example, T-62 tanks and MiG-25 planes were not purchased," the SLOWO POWSZECHNE writes further on.

A change in the tasks and proportions between the components of the Armed Forces is being carried out. For instance, according to SLOWO POWSZECHNE, two divisions were dissolved last year. These great tactical units were transformed into logistic bases, in other words into a system of weaponry and equipment warehouses. The same will happen to two more divisions this year. Moreover, two divisions will be cut down to 15 percent of the hitherto number of posts. Combining military (institutions) at different levels is also planned. The command of the Airforce and the command of Air Defence will be merged, for instance, the paper said.

Spokesman Urban Comments on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Plans

LD2501004989 Warsaw PAP in English 2346 GMT 24 Jan 89

[Excerpts] Moscow, Jan. 24—Polish Government spokesman Jerzy Urban at a press conference here today acquainted newsmen with the contents of documents adopted at the dramatic, as he put it, 10th plenum of the PUWP CC. [passage omitted]

One of the questions was about the promise to redeploy part of the Soviet troops stationed in Poland. Urban explained that in coordination with Polish authorities several regiments will be withdrawn together with some smaller units during this year, while one of the brigades will be withdrawn next year. Urban added that details will be agreed during Polish-Soviet negotiations.

PAKISTAN

Army Chief: Surface-To-Surface Missiles Tested

Addresses National Defense College

BK0502[illegible]89 Islamabad Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 5 Feb 89

[Text] Pakistan has successfully fired and tested indigenously manufactured surface-to-surface long-range missiles and will also be able to roll out the first homemade tanks within 2 years' time. This was stated by the chief of the Army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, while addressing a joint session of the participants of the national defense and Armed Forces [words indistinct] at the National Defense College in Rawalpindi today. Giving details of achieving this landmark in indigenous arms production, the chief of the Army staff said two types of surface-to-surface missiles—one having a range of 80 km and the other 300 km—were tested recently.

Further on Beg Comments

BK0502132189 Hong Kong AFP in English 1245 GMT 5 Feb 89

[Text] Islamabad, Feb 5 (AFP)—Pakistan has successfully fired and tested indigenously manufactured surface-to-surface long-range missiles, Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg said Sunday.

Addressing officers at the National Defense College in Rawalpindi, General Beg also disclosed that Pakistan would be able to roll out its first tanks within two years, the official ASSOCIATED PRESS OF PAKISTAN (APP) reported.

He did not say when the missiles were fired, but press reports said they were tested last month.

Gen Beg said Pakistan recently tested two types of missiles, with ranges of 80 kilometers and 300 kilometers respectively.

The missiles and their guidance systems were developed locally, Gen Beg added.

"These are extremely accurate systems and are capable to carry a payload of 500 kilograms," he told military students from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey, the APP said.

The Army chief said Pakistan's new tanks would "be capable of defeating any known armour in the world."

The Army chief also said Pakistan has achieved 90 percent self-sufficiency in all calibres of ammunition.

His statements follow accusations from Pakistan's traditional rival, India, that the new missiles could be intended to carry nuclear warheads.

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said Friday that India would take steps to ensure that its security was not threatened.

The two neighbours, which have fought three wars in the past 40 years, are suspicious of each other's nuclear programmes, although both claim to oppose acquisition of nuclear arms.

Gen Beg said: "this indigenisation is part of the process of building a strong deterrent capability so that the country was not made a victim of aggression."

More on Missiles Tests

BK0502162489 Islamabad Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 5 Feb 89

[Text] Pakistan has successfully test-fired two types of indigenously manufactured surface-to-surface long-range missiles and will also be able to roll out the first homemade tank within 2 years. This was stated by the chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, while addressing a joint session of participants at the national defense and Armed Forces war courses at the National Defense College in Rawalpindi today. The missiles—one having a range of 80 km and the other 300 km—are extremely accurate arms and carry a payload of 500 kg. The chief of the Army staff said the homemade tank to be ready within the next 2 years would be capable of defeating any known armor in the world today.

Americans Observe Destruction of Launchers at Stankovo, Belorussia
52000003 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 27 Nov 88 p 2

[Article by N. Dubovik, special SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA correspondent: "The Final Route of Combat Missile Launchers Traced by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA Correspondent"]

[Text] "Mr Corneal, could you have imagined 2-3 years ago that you would be witnessing along with Soviet officers the destruction of nuclear missiles?"

Lieutenant Colonel Terry K. Corneal, U.S. Army, listened attentively to the translation of the question into English and quite unexpectedly for the correspondent answered in Russian: "Never!" and, seeing my surprise, smiled.

That is how my meeting began with the American inspectors participating in the destruction of nuclear missile transporter vehicles and launchers concentrated in the village of Stankovo near Minsk. Strictly speaking, the missiles themselves are being eliminated at other places, but the process of destroying the launchers and transporter vehicles is also of considerable interest. The entire destruction process will last 18 months. It began at Stankovo on 1 August at 10:00, 2 hours before the historical explosion thundered at Saryozek, which destroyed the first four nuclear missiles. The elimination schedule has been calculated in detail and is being explicitly observed. Every 2 days, three launchers will cease to exist as combat units. To date, more than 100 have been destroyed. For the first time in the history of mankind, weapons are being destroyed not because they have become obsolete. The press indicates that just one submarine equipped with nuclear missiles can inflict damage exceeding many times over the casualties of World War II, which took 55 million human lives. Let us ponder this fact and give proper due to the policy which the USSR and USA have been pursuing recently. Even considering that only 4 percent of the stockpiled nuclear arsenals are to be destroyed under the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

With regret, I leaf through my notebook which is bulging with notes. Of course, they will not all be published. I will try to shed light, albeit in a fragmented manner, on the most interesting facts and impressions from the day spent at the operational missile facility.

I am not a military man, but I understood right away what commanders sometimes had to go through in maintaining missile launchers.

The combat vehicles were covered with snow...

"What's the use, it's all going to be scrapped," Lt Col V.A. Pavlov said. "They will go to the elimination site on their own. This is their final route."

Well, let us go over it, too. It is amazing. Missile launcher crewmen, who only recently were zealously monitoring order and serviceability in their outfit, are destroying the most complex parts and mechanisms of the missile launchers with just as much zeal. The merciless plasma torches were cutting through the unyielding steel with difficulty. A missile will never take off from here again. Igor Kanashchuk is distracted from his work for a minute and puts his cutter aside. He himself is originally from Krasnodarskiy Kray. He worked as a welder before coming into the Army. His peacetime profession came very handy now. He is soon to be demobilized. In his last days of service he is working with unconcealed satisfaction. I.I. Cherkasov, secretary of the party organization, names the best officers and soldiers. We will also name them. All the same, the event in which they are participating, you would agree, is out of the ordinary. It will be something to be remembered by officers Dyakov, Mukosin, Yefremov, and Khavskiy, and their subordinates Sidorov, Zmitrovich, Garinov, Blokhin and Mitrofanov.

In essence, the bays which earlier housed the combat missiles and launchers have been turned into workshops. Here and there, the blinding lights of an arc welder flash, cranes carry cut-up assemblies and components, and quick-moving trolleys dash about, carrying to the unloading site what is left of the once formidable weapons. From here the equipment parts are loaded on vehicles and sent to be remelted, and the prime mover is transferred to the national economy. Gennadiy Vasilyevich Chikurov does not conceal his joy. He has found a good motor vehicle. Although he has to reach Udmurt SSR on his own, he is confident that he will handle the journey.

American representatives closely monitor the entire procedure. Judging from their faces, everything is going "okay." The leader of the American inspection team gladly answers questions. Yes, and he considers his mission as a representative of the American government to be the highest and most honorable.

"Mr Corneal, how do you regard people's diplomacy?"

"I believe that is precisely where peace and friendship begin. People's diplomacy maybe even contributes more to rapprochement between us than other official contacts."

"Is this the first time you have met Soviet people?"

"No, about 4 months ago I visited the Soviet Union with the inspection team. I also met Russians during a similar mission in the GDR."

"How long have you been in Stankovo?"

"Three days in all."

"Have any questions come up related to your immediate work?"

"Everything was and is okay! From a professional standpoint, the job has been excellently organized."

"The signing of the Soviet-American Treaty was an act of historical importance..."

"Yes, I totally agree. There is a great future because of the agreement. I have in mind the possible 50-percent reduction in nuclear arsenals. But not only that. There have also been more than enough chemical and conventional weapons stockpiled."

"In the event of successful continuation of the disarmament process which has begun, you personally are threatened with unemployment. Aren't you worried?"

"I have asked Soviet officers this question. The answers were the same in Russian and in English: Everyone would only be happy with that."

"A final question. How did you perceive the launching of "Energiya" and "Buran?"

"Oh, that was a magnificent launch. I am very happy for your success. I am delighted and amazed by the quality of the experiment."

A question about the "evil empire" was on the tip of my tongue for a long time (from the very beginning). Finally, I decided to ask it.

"For a long time, we, and you with respect to us, fostered the image of an enemy," Mr Corneal answered, not a bit embarrassed. "The Soviet and American people are interested in peace. I am glad that everyone finally understands this. We are, as it turns out, alike in this way."

We talked longer with the Americans. The topics were varied, not even associated with their crucial mission. In response to my not too tactful question about pay, LTC Max Harshman, in artillery, responded mildly that he was not poor and not rich. The very first impression about the USSR, of course, is Red Square in Moscow. Especially since their group met American tourists there who highly praised the mission of the American inspectors.

This was John Matson's first trip to the USSR, but back home he had studied the geography and history of our country. He was also happy for the qualitative change toward improving relations between our peoples.

Evening was approaching. Preparations were being made to sign the documents confirming the elimination of three more transporter vehicles. The American inspectors had no questions after inspecting the vehicles. They signed the document: LTC Terry K. Corneal for the American side; Maj Gerus, facility representative, for the Soviet side. Col V.M. Germanovich, department chief of the Center for Elimination of Medium-Range Missiles, congratulated all team members for the successful completion of the first phase.

We left the military unit's location. The once formidable combat vehicles powdered with snow disappeared behind the curve. In the distance, beyond the barbed wire fence, the barely distinguishable silhouette of a sentry appeared indistinctly. All the work planned for the day had been performed precisely on schedule and on time. Tomorrow, the next batch of launchers would come.

After the U.S. presidential elections, the Gallup Institute conducted a public opinion poll. Here is what it showed: 83 percent of Americans supported concluding new Soviet-American relations in the area of trade and more active involvement of U.S. business circles in them; 76 percent of those polled are convinced of the peaceful disposition of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet government will pursue a policy of friendship and good-neighbor relations with other states.

The events now taking place in Stankovo are evidence of that.

In photos [not reproduced]: Mr Terry K. Corneal, leader of the American inspection team, and Col V.M. Germanovich, representative of the Center for Elimination of Medium-Range Missiles; all that is left of the combat vehicles—for scrap metal; G.V. Chikurov is satisfied with his new motor vehicle.

General Lizichev Discusses Troops Cuts, Urges Western Response

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[Text] Prague Jan 26 (CTK)—"We maintain a clear stand ensuing from the new political thinking and the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency. Our arms and troop cuts are an example for everyone, above all for NATO, and have been already followed by other Warsaw Treaty states—Hungary, the GDR. A certain proposal has been worked out also in Czechoslovakia", visiting Soviet Army General Aleksey Lizichev told CTK here Thursday [26 January].

The head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy pointed out that Mikhail Gorbachev's address at the U.N. General Assembly session aimed at ensuring security and peace was welcomed by the Soviet Army representatives. Mikhail Gorbachev announced the troop cuts by 500,000 men. The number of tanks will be reduced by 10,000, artillery systems by 8,500 and aircraft by 800.

"Unfortunately, our Western partners have not responded yet to our initiatives by concrete actions. The Soviet troop cuts are a process to last two years (1989-1990). These two years seem to be enough for the West to make up its mind and make a decision", Aleksey Lizichev said.

He added that the Soviet Union has demonstrated its realistic attitude towards the troop and arms cuts, both in the sphere of strategic offensive and conventional weapons.

However, these steps and efforts at balance of interests and forces have not met with adequate reaction in the West, he said and gave figures demonstrating U.S. superiority in many spheres, e.g. the Soviet Union has two aircraft carriers with 38 planes deployed on each, while the United States has 15 aircraft carriers with 98 planes on each, the Americans have 1,400 more airplanes in Europe than the Soviets, they have more helicopters.

As to the principle of reasonable sufficiency, Alekseу Lizichev said this is a principle of building the armed forces in harmony with the defensive doctrine. At present, the Soviet Armed Forces are being re-built on this principle in order to make the Army and the Navy minimum but in accord with the military and political situation in the world. They should ensure reliable defence of the Soviet Union and other friendly countries.

"Our strategic nuclear forces, i.e. ground strategic missile forces, submarines with ballistic nuclear missiles and strategic bombers, are to be built on the principle of balance with the U.S. strategic forces. This is the principle we shall observe till the question of total liquidation of strategic nuclear forces is definitively solved", Alekseу Lizichev said.

'Problem-Solving' Approach to Negotiations Urged

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[Article by Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and leader of the Scientific Council for Negotiations of the USSR Academy of Sciences Systems Analysis Committee, Prof Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremenyuk, doctor of historical sciences and a leader of the "International Negotiations" project of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenberg (Austria), and Viktor Mikhaylovich Sergeyev, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences and leader of the Laboratory of the Structural Analysis and Modeling of Military-Political and Managerial Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute: "Questions of Study of International Negotiations"]

[Text]

I

The number of negotiations which are being conducted is growing, and their subject range and scale are expanding—such is a permanent trend of the development of the international community, of the system of interstate relations included.

Within the framework of this steady long-term trend there are periods of rise and fall, when some negotiations become almost fruitless, and others cease altogether and are suspended.

The sources of such rises and falls should be sought in the more general trends and patterns of the development of international relations. However, the parties' negotiating activity has its own regularities.

Negotiations are becoming virtually the main (and, sometimes, the sole) method of the settlement of conflicts and contradictions and also of the joint solution of problems confronting this or the other pair or group of states and nongovernment organizations.

At the same time, however, we have witnessed repeatedly how negotiations have been used merely as a tactical subterfuge and represented an attempt to demonstrate to the community an outwardly decorous approach to a solution of complex problems, but in practice, however, have been the cover for an evasion of their solution in the hope of preservation or acquisition of one-sided advantages.

At the end of the 1970's-start of the 1980's considerable numbers of the public in the West, and in our country and a number of East European socialist countries also, repeatedly voiced their unhappiness with the progress of the negotiations on central international problems—arms limitation and reduction and the solution of military-political conflict situations—and on international trade and economic and financial problems and others.

The state of the negotiations on these problems, military-political particularly, including disarmament issues, in that period did indeed leave much to be desired. The main reason for this was the strengthening of conservative and rightwing trends in the political life of the United States and a number of other developed capitalist states. For many prominent figures of the U.S. Republican administration, which assumed office following the 1980 elections, negotiations based on the principles of the parties' equality and equal security developed earlier within the framework of Soviet-American interaction altogether did not represent a mode of relations with the USSR and its allies.

The intention of achieving military superiority to the USSR recorded in the 1980 U.S. Republican Party platform was manifestly contrary to any serious, constructive approach to a solution of arms limitation and disarmament problems. This intention was a departure

from the official line of the preservation of parity and general military-strategic balance proclaimed by the R. Nixon, G. Ford and J. Carter administrations in the 1970's.

It should be mentioned that moderate political forces of the American bourgeoisie, in opposition following the 1980 elections, noted from the very outset the unrealistic and unattainable nature of the intention to restore overall military-strategic superiority to the USSR, which the United States had lost toward the end of the 1980's. But a direct demand for military superiority to the Soviet Union was missing from the 1984 platform of the Republican Party and from public official documents of the administration of this and the subsequent period.

At the start of the 1980's rightwing-conservative forces in the United States not only saw no point in any arms control and reduction negotiations but made persistent attempts to do away with the treaties and agreements which had been reached in the 1970's and 1960's even. The realization of such positions would have cast the system of interstate relations a long way back in the development of the manageability of the international community.

So-called "unilateralism"—the purely autonomous actions of the United States considering to the minimum extent the interests of many other members of the international community—predominated in this period in the activity of the United States—a most important subject of international relations. This approach of U.S. rightwing-conservative circles was manifested not only in the sphere of disarmament and American-Soviet relations as a whole. It was reflected also in a whole number of most important international-economic and currency-finance problems, the use of ocean resources, the sabotaging of the UN International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development and so forth.

The United States' gamble on unilateral actions directly and indirectly stimulated also the analogous behavior of other states—of a number of developing countries, for example, on problems of their foreign debt.

The early and middle 1980's were marked by a lack of success in the solution of regional conflict and crisis situations and in a halt to small and big local wars (and, frequently, the absence also of the negotiation process itself). There was, as a whole, an increasingly dangerous accumulation of unsettled problems, which led to an erosion of stability in the international community.

The reluctance of the Republican administration in the first half of the 1980's to tackle the majority of urgent problems by means of negotiations gave rise to a search for different paths of a solution. The most interesting in this respect was the example involving tests of antisatellite [ASAT] weapons against real targets in space and the placement of these weapons in space.

At a meeting with a group of U.S. senators headed by C. Pell on 18 August 1983 Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, announced the imposition of a moratorium on the placement in space (in fact on the testing in space) of Soviet ASAT weapons as long as the other side refrained from such actions. This act met with a negative response on the part of the U.S. Administration, the leadership of the Defense Department and the Air Force Command, which was rapidly developing an ASAT system of, in their estimation, a new generation compared with that which existed in the USSR. However, it met with broad understanding and support in the U.S. Congress, which relied on scientists' opinion, and also among a number of professional military men, who believed with good reason that the development of an arms race in this sphere, even if the United States were to have some temporary advantages, would ultimately be equally contrary to the security interests of both parties.

A coalition of supporters of a ban on ASAT systems—primarily in the U.S. Congress' House of Representatives—began to actively take shape under the influence of the Soviet unilateral moratorium.

Every political process has its own dynamics. And this coalition was unable right away to acquire sufficient strength to ban appropriations for ASAT systems before the U.S. Air Force was ready to begin a series of tests against real targets in space. The first such test was carried out, which released the Soviet Union from its unilateral moratorium. However, the Soviet side showed restraint, and immediate analogous measures did not follow. This permitted the coalition of ASAT opponents in the United States to broaden its base and seek a ban on appropriations for testing, despite the fact that the U.S. Defense Department had launched two special target satellites at a cost of approximately $30 million (they were not used as intended. This fact points to the significant strength of the ASAT weapon opponents movement). As a result a mutual moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons has been in effect from 1983 through the present without having been officialized in the treaty-legal sphere and without there having been negotiations. This is undoubtedly an important achievement.

The stagnation phenomena in our state and society could not have failed to have been reflected in the Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy of the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's. A lack of dynamism and the capacity to react properly to the changing situation, not to mention the capacity for looking to the subsequent phase of development of the international-political process, was manifested in a whole number of instances in our diplomacy. We were repeatedly late in putting forward initiatives and paid insufficient attention to directions of our foreign policy other than the American direction. New approaches to negotiations and their subject and tactics proposed by a number of our top diplomats, scientists and specialists had a hard time paving a way for themselves.

Thus for a number of years simplistic, arithmetical ideas concerning military-strategic parity, which emasculated its essence and sharply constricted the field for maneuver, were predominant in political practice in the approach to arms limitation and disarmament problems.

As S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, rightly observed, in the 1970's and the start of the 1980's we responded too rectilinearly to the arms race initiated by the West; we should have been more enterprising in finding political weapons, winning the public to our side and showing the danger of the arms race more honestly. Yu.M. Vorontsov, first deputy USSR foreign minister, said with good reason that in the field of diplomacy we were too taken up with polemics; the propaganda motive frequently got in the way of real work.[1]

And although our practice in this sphere has changed appreciably for the better, the question of the optimum correlation between negotiations and the public polemic surrounding these negotiations in the interests of the broad community of all the countries and peoples concerned has not conceptually as yet, it would seem, been adequately resolved.

II

Since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum the Soviet leadership has taken active steps to achieve an appreciable change for the better in the USSR's foreign policy position and in international relations as a whole. Scientists, of both the social and natural sciences, and specialists in the field of technology have begun to play a considerably more active part here. Diplomacy has turned to face science, in the formulation of negotiating positions on most important problems, in the sphere of disarmament primarily, included. Without fear of their criticism, scientists' opinion has come to be heeded in an evaluation of the results of negotiations also. We may mention from our personal experience the attention which is being paid today by politicians, diplomats and the military to scientists' critical studies pertaining to problems of international conflict and crisis situations, questions of prevention of an arms race in space, problems of ensuring strategic stability given radical cutbacks in nuclear arms and questions of the increased stability of the military-strategic balance at the level of armed forces and conventional arms given a reduction therein.

At the negotiations themselves, active top-level diplomacy included, the Soviet side has come to be characterized by consideration to a fuller extent not only of its own interests and the interests of its allies but also the interests of the other side and a display of flexibility and dynamism. The problem-solving principle, as distinct from the principle of maximization of gain, which is still professed by considerable numbers of Western diplomats and politicians, has been made the basis. This is creating an entirely new situation at international negotiations.

The orientation of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy and negotiating practice toward use of the problem-solving principle, which has intensified manifestly in recent years, has a sound basis. Pertaining here are the propositions concerning the growing interdependence and wholeness of the contemporary system of international relations, granted all their diversity, and concerning the fact that under modern conditions security can only be mutual. These propositions are figuring not only in the works of Soviet scholars but also in official documents and the speeches of leading statesmen and politicians, leaders of the USSR Foreign Ministry and Soviet diplomats performing various negotiating functions.

The "balance of interests" concept, which appeared initially simply as a fortunate metaphor, is acquiring ever increasing political-psychological and operational meaning for the new approach to international negotiations.

Consistent realization of the problem-solving principle presupposes the need for additional, at times very extensive, science-intensive preparatory work—on a more precise mutually acceptable definition of the problem and the goals which the parties which have entered the negotiations have to achieve. In fact all these are tasks for classical systems analysis, whose techniques and methodology differ little from one another in the scientific culture of many countries, regardless of their affiliation to this alliance and this system or the other. Prior to the start of the negotiations the formulation to the maximum extent possible of common views on strategic stability would, in particular, seem highly important as such preliminary work.

It should not, however, be thought that all here is now proceeding smoothly and that complete harmony has been established between policy and diplomacy on the one hand and science on the other. Men of practice still have a utilitarian idea not only of applied (where this is justified, on the whole) but also basic theoretical research.

There has still been no radical change for the better in the provision of scientific research with archive material—from party archives and USSR Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry archives.

For its part, science, affected in many of its segments by viruses of the stagnation period, is far from always prepared to give out important results of an applied and theoretical nature and to determine the character of the

relationship between "high theory" and practice, not to mention the fact that by science we often imply that which is not such and which performs other functions, journalistic, for example.

To speak of negotiating tactics, the traditional approach, whereby the initial negotiating position is overstated to the maximum, is present to a considerable extent here. This is done with a view to having in the course of the negotiations by way of hard bargaining room for maneuver and an opportunity for reaching a compromise with the other party. A seemingly correct idea, as a whole. But its embodiment under the new conditions, given the tremendous attention to negotiations on the part of the public, requires the particularly careful development of the initial negotiating position lest it contain barely defensible elements.

In addition, a significant retreat from an original negotiating position is perceived painfully by a certain part of public opinion within the country, which is treating negotiations and all their peripeteias with ever increasing interest, but which is at the same time for understandable reasons not always adequately informed about the particular features of this negotiating position or the other.

III

The speech of USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze at the United Nations in the fall of 1985 posed the task of the elaboration of new negotiating mechanisms corresponding to the level and complexity of the problems being tackled in international relations.

The accomplishment of this task requires not only organizational solutions but also procedural and theoretical studies. It is a question of studies which, with a specific orientation toward the needs of negotiating practice, reflect in full all the particular features of the international situation prevailing as of the present day and also the possibilities which are now at the disposal of the modern science of control of social processes, in the sphere of international relations included. Additional possibilities are emerging also thanks to new-generation computers and simplification of "man-computer" interface methods. This is contributing not only to the accomplishment of tasks of database organization support for the negotiation process but also to the development (with certain assumptions and limitations) of models oriented toward optimization of the solution of contentious problems.

It is becoming the generally accepted opinion in the international community that fair, equal negotiations are perfectly capable of serving as an alternative to military solutions, providing for the settlement of contentious problems in the economic, humanitarian and ecological spheres of the system of international relations and countering its entropy. The further revelation and specification of the concept of the stabilizing function of negotiations and the nature of their interaction with the international environment and the political situation in the participating countries are essential. What is needed is an accurate and adjusted analysis of the main obstacles in the way of successful negotiations and also an elucidation of the propitious factors and, what is most important, the possibilities of their stimulation. An evaluation of the change in the functions of negotiations and the actions of the parties in connection with the transformation of the vast conglomerate of international negotiations into a distinctive system which has come about is essential also.

The new significance which is attached to negotiations in the present international situation and also the ever increasing complexity of the problems with which the participants are having to deal are posing in earnest the question of the need for the creation of elements of a theory of negotiations.

Despite the fact that there is no orderly and generalized theory on this score either in the everyday use of the diplomacy of the socialist states or that of their negotiating partners, an intuitive perception of the need for their theoretical comprehension has, nonetheless, for a long time colored the practice of almost all the participants in international negotiations.

The element of the theoretical approach has been expressed most strongly in American practice in connection with the development of the theory and practice of practical negotiations in the sphere of business and law.

The following may be cited as the distinguishing features of this theoretical approach, which has taken shape spontaneously over long years of practice: negotiations are an instrument of continuation of a state's foreign policy and should therefore serve its goals and interests primarily; negotiations represent a hidden form of conflict, in which the participant's priority goal should be "victory," that is, the conclusion of an agreement on his terms or, on the other hand, a demonstration of the "instability and irrationality" of the opponent; negotiations are directly associated with the partners' correlation of forces, and for this reason it makes sense to consent to negotiations given a correlation of forces which is favorable to oneself, otherwise they should be avoided (the correlation of military forces primarily has been taken into consideration here in the political sphere also). Negotiations have been regarded here as an indicator of diplomatic art, and for this reason they have had to remain the lot of high-class professionals, particularly accredited representatives who have commended themselves with years of impeccable service. Evaluating these views, which are prevalent in the United States and other developed capitalist countries, we may make the following observations.

A whole number of new circumstances has radically changed negotiating conditions. International negotiations are becoming virtually the main form of states' interaction; they are not only (and not so much) recording changes in the correlation of military forces but also actively influencing a lessening of the role of the military factor. The compass and number of negotiations are growing; the sum total of unsolved contentious questions accumulated in the years of confrontation and also problems of an entirely new character (the environment, joint ventures, S&T cooperation) are becoming the subjects of negotiations and, in turn, are giving rise to new subjects. The negotiating role of international organizations, whose functions were for a long time paralyzed by the atmosphere of confrontation, is being stepped up. New masses of people who lack experience of diplomatic work but who nonetheless are called upon to play an appreciable part here are being actively enlisted in the negotiation sphere. Questions of the management of negotiations are arising constantly: reservation of the most important problems for the highest level of leadership of the country, definition of the sphere of competence of various working levels, elaboration of a system of delegation of responsibility, determination of the nature of the coordinating role of diplomatic departments.

Not only specially appointed delegations and diplomatic departments have been enlisted in negotiations on both sides. On arms limitation and reduction and disarmament issues representatives of the defense ministries, defense industry, the security services and other departments participate in them directly. Behind each delegation conducting the negotiations there is always a team consisting of representatives of these departments and also representatives of the country's top state leadership. Negotiations are in fact conducted between departments and also different groupings within each country. They are frequently of a considerably more complex nature even than the direct negotiations between the delegations and between the heads of the diplomatic departments. Such internal negotiations do not, as a rule, end here by the time the official intergovernmental negotiations start but proceed in parallel with them. That is, internal bargaining continues simultaneously with that under way on the international scene. Consideration of this fact is essential, it makes negotiations as a subject of study an exceptionally complex system and demands, accordingly, a systemic, multifactor approach.

In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the role of the technical components of negotiations, which is once again manifested in most concrete form in the sphere of the limitation of and a reduction in armed forces and arms. The content and subject of the negotiations on strategic arms and nuclear weapons as a whole have become considerably more complex before our very eyes for some 15 to 18 years. It is sufficient to compare the wording of the 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms with the SALT II Treaty signed in 1979, and the latter, in turn, with the INF Treaty signed in 1987. It may be anticipated that an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, if achieved, will prove even more complex than the INF Treaty. But even this would not appear to be the limit of the complication of the S&T aspect of negotiations and potential agreements. Thus negotiations on limiting armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals will evidently reach an even higher level of complexity, by virtue of the fact that these will not be bilateral negotiations but ones involving the participation of more than 30 states included.

The increased complexity of the subject of these negotiations on a strengthening of strategic stability in this sphere, the number of potential participants in these negotiations and the diversity of their nonconincident interests have stimulated a search for extra-negotiation approaches to the solution of this problem. There has been an intensification in the FRG, the Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain of studies on questions of "nonoffensive defense," "nonprovocative defense," "territorial defense" and so forth. Many of the components of the corresponding principles of the organizational development of the armed forces and changes in their structure, composition, deployment and provision with this weapons system or the other could, the developers of these concepts believe, be adopted by Western countries, primarily the FRG and Great Britain, unilaterally in the hope that the Warsaw Pact states would follow this example.

The role of top state and political leaders in negotiations and the possibility of their personal intervention in the course of negotiations for the sake of the achievement of some radical results and breakthroughs have increased. The development of communications systems and jet aircraft and a number of other factors are contributing to this to a considerable extent.

It would seem that a developed theory of negotiations could contribute to the accomplishment of the following tasks:

—The elaboration of a common strategy and specification of the system of interests and goals in new areas of negotiations where the situation is not entirely clear. The building of models of political situations representing an instrument for an understanding of conditions of considerable uncertainty and great technical complexity (arms reduction, ecological problems, economic interdependence).

—An institutional analysis of current negotiating practice, the purpose of which would be to contribute to the creation of the most efficient negotiating mechanisms and study of how the forms of the negotiations should depend on the subject of the negotiations, how best to organize the interaction of diplomats and specialists in specific subject fields and on what terms to enlist various state and research organizations in the negotiation process.

—The elaboration of methods increasing the efficiency of negotiations, specifically, an improvement in database organization and support and the creation of methods of the express analysis of negotiating positions; an improvement in diplomatic practice, including the training of diplomats in negotiating tactics. New approaches to the elaboration of a common negotiation strategy have been outlined in the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev and also E.A. Shevardnadze and a number of other leaders of the USSR Foreign Ministry. In particular, they emphasize the role of negotiations as a most important mechanism of the solution of contentious international problems, the need for observance of the principles of equal benefit and mutual consideration of the negotiating partners' legitimate interests and the principles of equal access to the necessary information and the need for the elaboration of mutually acceptable procedures of the negotiation mechanisms based on political accords.

The conceptual basis of this new strategy of negotiations should be not the principle of optimization of unilateral gain but the problem-solving principle. In other words, the basis of the negotiating process should be a search for the optimum solution of the problems formulated on the agenda, and not a complex and costly (in the time sense) "bargaining" process, an exchange of concessions or the formation of a compromise, which often led to unbalanced agreements which failed to stand the test of time. The development of modeling methods and decision-making theory based on positive approaches makes it possible at the present time to approach anew the modeling of negotiating situations.

In practice this approach has already been applied. For example, a model of the optimum solution of the problem of the contemporary law of the sea devised in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (United States) was studied in the United Nations at the time of agreement of the Law of the Sea Convention. There are examples of the development of models of a solution of the problems of acid rain and the monitoring of the pollution of international rivers and seas, which are also essentially becoming subjects of the corresponding negotiations. The "AS" dialogue computer system for an analysis of the stability of the system of military-strategic interaction under the conditions of deep cuts in nuclear arms was developed in the period 1985-1987 in the USSR under the aegis of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Danger in the Laboratory of Structural Analysis and Modeling of Military-Political and Managerial Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute. Several versions of cuts in strategic offensive arms of 50, 75 and 95 percent with regard for ABM factors, strategic ASW forces and weapons and air defenses were studied with this model.[2] The POST-2 computer model devised by the Disarmament Department of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations in cooperation with the Military-Political Research Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute was also oriented toward the accomplishment of similar tasks.[3]

The problem of the increased efficiency of a separate component of the system of international negotiations—the negotiating situation—is under current conditions becoming a very considerable aspect of the theory of negotiations. It is a question here not simply of the elaboration of a sum total of rules and procedures which would facilitate the negotiations to the maximum possible extent. For the accomplishment of the general task—an increase in the efficiency of the entire array of negotiations and the creation of a mechanism of the settlement of disputes and disagreements—fundamental changes are needed in the very approach to negotiating: the creation of a hierarchy, echeloned in terms of degree of responsibility and competence, of negotiations and consultations (from unofficial exchanges of opinions between experts through formal negotiations and decision-making), the development by experts of different countries of joint models of a possible solution of problems and the development of the negotiating process from a state of conflict into a state of joint quest for the most optimum solution of contentious problems with regard for the actual possibilities of the parties concluding the agreement and the assistance from the international community.

And, finally, the development of modern information technology, particularly methods of AI and expert systems, should be a boost to a qualitatively new level of the database organization support of the negotiations, which under the conditions of the constant complication of negotiating situations is an essential condition of the effective solution of international problems.

IV

Of course, the creation of a theory of negotiations is possible only on the basis of a wide-ranging analysis of the processes of international cooperation with regard for the singularities of the political thinking and cultural traditions of the participants in the system of international negotiations. Let us now examine in more detail certain approaches to the creation of a theory of negotiations and an improvement in their technical support.

There are at the present time appreciable differences in the approaches to study of negotiations, of which the main ones are historical (with the emphasis on study of specific conditions) and socio-psychological (negotiations as interpersonal relations) and also diverse approaches based on a study of various mathematical models of negotiations, in which the main role is usually performed by games theory. However, the principles of the building of these models remain highly debatable as yet.

The classic example of a negotiating situation in which optimization games theories are inapplicable is the so-called "prisoner's dilemma". Many negotiating tasks result in such a game. This problem has been studied in many works. Numerous experimental studies have been conducted: such a game has been played many times over by specially selected persons. However, the results which have been obtained prove quite contradictory. One has the impression that the very applicability of the classical game-theory approach to a study of the process of negotiations could be a matter of doubt.

The weakest point of this approach would seem to be the extreme rationalism of games theory and the total lack of regard for the structure of the consciousness of the player. All the players are completely depersonalized. It is believed that every person in a specific game situation will behave identically—as prompted by "rational choice" based on the application of games theory.

There are similar shortcomings to the models of negotiations which have been developed in recent years based on study of so-called "concession dynamics". The idea of the progress of negotiations as a reciprocal response to the partner's concessions is made the basis of these models. The main concept of theory is "concession speed". Use of this value makes it possible to describe the process of the negotiations by a system of differential equations. The main and fundamental shortcoming of these models is the same as for the models based on games theory. It is assumed that the participants are essentially identical. It is this assumption which affords an opportunity for speaking of an optimum strategy of the negotiations in isolation from their context. However, attempts to find a universal optimum strategy are obviously doomed to fail since an optimum strategy of negotiations depends on the content of the negotiations and also on the context of the situation in which these negotiations are conducted.

In our view, the building of substantive models of negotiations is associated with the solution of the following problems:

1. The elaboration of methods of consideration of the context, that is, determination of the venue, of the negotiations in the system of the conflict which the negotiations are designed to resolve.

2. The elaboration of methods of analysis of the cognitive structure of each participant in the negotiations. This problem is broken down into two: (a) an analysis of the structure of the conflict and the methods of its solution as it appears to each participant; (b) an analysis of the pattern of decision-making by each participant. The structure of the relations between the delegation conducting the negotiations and the leadership of the organization which this delegation represents is of the greatest interest here.

3. A structural analysis of the negotiation process itself.

Let us now examine the analysis of the cognitive structure of the participants in the negotiations. It is of extraordinary importance to note that each participant in the negotiations has his particular image of the conflict, and these images may not coincide. It is here that additional opportunities for agreement emerge.

The image of the conflict is dynamic, and a solution of the conflict by means of an accord could change the situation completely. It is essential to consider in the negotiation process not only what is now but also what will emerge following implementation of the accord, considering not only the position of the opponent but also external factors, which could change following (or as a result of) achievement of an accord. By virtue of what has been said, the participant who possesses a more developed image of the conflict considering a large number of interconnections and has a better forecast of future events will acquire significant advantages during the negotiations since he could persuade the adversary to accept a proposal of little importance given a superficial view, but in fact of decisive significance for the future.

We thus see that the structure of ideas concerning a conflict is of decisive significance in the choice of the tactics and strategy of the negotiations, and it is for this reason that attempts to formulate universal tactics or a universal strategy of negotiations in abstract terms of the "concession speed" or "carrot and stick" type are absolutely useless. Although useful when analyzing the negotiations, all these concepts may be used only on condition of the preliminary specific ascertainment of the structure of the position and image of the conflict represented in the simplest cases in the form of related target graphs.

Let us now examine the relations between the delegation at the negotiations and the organization which sent it. Negotiations are impossible without certain sets of instructions fixing the maximum permissible concessions. It would seem that the vagueness of the results obtained in psychological experiments pertaining to study of negotiations, specifically during the "prisoner's dilemma" context, is a consequence of the fact that those being tested were not built into some social mechanism which has strictly fixed their values. Essentially the negotiation model itself in such experiments is inadequate to reality. It is essential that the negotiations presuppose a certain external social reality, which puts pressure on the representatives conducting the negotiations. There is a redefinition here, so to speak, of the "objective" and "rational" utilities with which games theory operates. These "objective" and "rational" utilities are subjective, but truly objective utilities are utilities determined by the social reality in which the participant in the negotiations is immersed, and these utilities take into consideration not only his advantage but also the size of the advantage of the adversary.

Thus cognitive analysis and study of the "world models" of the parties to negotiations could be a principal analytical instrument making it possible to obtain knowledge of the negotiating situation and to "explain" it. It is

the structure of the participants' "world models," the system of values, interests and objectives and scenarios of the future development of events which determine to a decisive extent the outcome of the interaction between the parties to the negotiations.

Artificial intelligence methods, which are being developed intensively at the present time, make it possible to realize cognitive models of decision-making by the parties to negotiations in the form of computer programs and afford an opportunity in principle for various versions of the flow of the negotiations to be examined with the techniques of expert systems. It should be mentioned, however, that this direction of negotiation modeling—highly promising—is merely at the start of the way.

Introduction of the new political thinking in the everyday use of international relations together with the existence of a vast amount of contentious and unsettled problems poses squarely the question of a radical increase in the efficiency of international negotiations. It is no longer possible to regard this prospect from the standpoints of traditional diplomacy, which has often been guided by the criteria of "bargaining" and resourceful combinations to the detriment of the balance and efficiency of the adopted decisions. An understanding of the prospects of a complex and fundamental period in human history connected with the advancement of tasks of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security requires the thorough development of qualitatively new means and methods by the joint efforts of men of practice and scientists.

Footnotes:

1. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 June 1988.

2. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms. Concise Account of a Study," Moscow, 1987, pp 23-33, 36-39.

3. See "Disarmament and Security. Yearbook of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations: 1987," Moscow, 1988, pp 283-299. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK. KPSS "Pravda".
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988.

Dispute Over Academic Discussion of Arms Control, Security Issues

Theoretical Approach Defended

18160003k Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 125-130

[E. Pozdnyakov rejoinder: "With Whom, How and For What Reason Is A. Arbatov in Dispute?"]

[Excerpts] Reading some articles in our newspapers and journals today, you find out for yourself not only much that is new but sometimes what is simply a surprise, what you yourself would never have guessed.

A. Arbatov's article carried in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA [MEMO] Nos 4 and 5 for the present year is no exception in this respect.[1] I and many of my colleagues learned from it with amazement (although not unprofitably, it should be said) that there are in "Soviet political scientist circles" two schools, two currents, between which a dispute, sometimes latent, sometimes manifest, has allegedly long been under way, a highly fundamental dispute, what is more. According to the classification of the author himself, this is the dispute between so-called "lyric poets" (they are the "politicians" or "political lyric poets") and "phycisists" (they are the "technocrats"). Is there such a division into "physicists" and "lyric poets" in Soviet political scientist circles, is there really a dispute under way between them—it is about this that I would like to speak. [passage omitted]

Speaking on behalf, as it were, of one of the two camps, namely, the "physicists" ("technocrats"), A. Arbatov is very energetic in aiming critical barbs at the camp of his "ideological" enemies—the "lyric poets" ("politicians"). [passage omitted]

However, it was difficult for me to imagine even that A. Arbatov is in dispute with some invented characters. For this reason I carefully reread the article in search of an addressee of the criticism, and my labors were rewarded. One place in the article contains a more or less clear indication of whom he has in mind. Taking issue with my viewpoint concerning the correlation of policy and its means and not agreeing with it,[2] on page 19 of issue No 5 A. Arbatov notes that E. Pozdnyakov's pronouncement which he has quoted is **"highly typical of the 'political school'** and for this reason merits more detailed analysis" (my emphasis—E.P.). I will dwell on the essence of this analysis later, but I would like now to say something else.

So the "lyric poets" have acquired, albeit not without effort, some flesh and blood: they are, at a minimum, myself and those who in one way or another share my viewpoint. Inasmuch as there are in the article no other pointers as to whom A. Arbatov has in mind by "lyric poets," I have every reason to take as being addressed to me all the unaddressed charges with which he so generously bestrewed in his article the "lyric poets" in general.

I am, to be honest, little, if at all, embarrassed by the fact that I have come to be in the "lyric poets" category (there is even something flattering in this), but inasmuch as I have been put there not per my own wishes, then, as a meticulous individual, I would like to investigate the grounds in accordance with which this was done and which prompted A. Arbatov to publicly maintain the existence in our political science of two seemingly contending schools.

We find in the article three groups of arguments confirming, in the author's opinion, the existence of these different currents and the dispute between them. These

are they. "The representatives of one of them (the "physicists"—E.P.) believe that study of these topics (problems of security and disarmament—E.P.) requires in-depth knowledge of military strategy, weapons systems and the military balance of forces." The adherents to the other (the "lyric poets") not only maintain that the main thing is policy and that military-technical details, the "pieces of iron," so to speak, divert analysis from the main issues but altogether "deny the need for study of military specifics" (No 4, pp 11, 21). Where do they maintain and deny all this, I would like to know?

I can in respect of this argument express an opinion which coincides entirely with that which is commonly accepted and for this reason cannot fail to be banal, for which I apologize.

The point being that the existence of varying schools of research in any science, international relations included, is a perfectly natural thing for any object of investigation is multifaceted, and each such facet could serve as a special subject of study. Altogether they afford broader and deeper knowledge of the subject, complementing one another. Counterposing some schools to others is not only futile but also simply harmful, and whoever does so undoubtedly merits censure. A. Arbatov, to judge by everything, believes that it is the "lyric poets" who are guilty of such a counterpoise for it is they, according to him, who deny the need for study of military specifics, that is, that in which he himself is involved.

But one wonders: who has denied this need where and when? It needs to be pointed out, reference needs to be made, otherwise such an unaddressed accusation against one's opponents of things which they have not maintained (publicly, in the press, at least) would seem improper (given such a mode of debate, one could ascribe to one's opponents whatever one wished: it is impossible to either confirm or deny this, and everything depends on the scrupulousness or, on the contrary, unscrupulousness of whoever does this).

But, to continue. We find in the introduction to the second article (No 5) a different cause of the disagreements: "the subject of the differences between them (the "physicists" and "lyric poets"—E.P.) is rather," the author continues, "what kind of theory is needed here, in what way to elaborate it and how closely it should be linked with practice. The 'technocrats,' in the main, advocate the inductive method.... Representatives of the 'political' school adhere, for the most part, to the deductive method..." (p 18).

It is extremely surprising for me to read all this. At the end of the 20th century, given the mass of accumulated and largely generalized scientific material, it could occur only to a person far removed from philosophy to counterpose, as in Bacon's times, the inductive method to the deductive and believe that it is the inductive method which is closest to practice (if, of course, the reference is not to the practice of primitive man), not to mention the fact that there is in practice simply no such separation in respect of these methods: depending on the specific scientific ends and tasks, scholars employ one method or the other, not even aware of this frequently. Incidentally, about methodology: A. Arbatov's assertion that the "technocrats" are endeavoring with the aid of the inductive method to find the "**political 'philosophers' stone**' of the problems of international security" (my emphasis—E.P.) sounds quite curious inasmuch as he puts this search on the same footing as alchemy, as it were, and thereby condemns it to failure in advance. Although it is understood, of course, that the expression "philsophers' stone" is used by the author for effect.

Finally, right at the end of the article the author—quite unexpectedly and in defiance of the first two arguments—makes a statement which cannot fail to dismay: "The dispute between the 'politicians' and 'technocrats' (the latter-day 'lyric poets' and 'physicists')," he writes, "is more often than not without a real basis." It is, the author continues, "caused for the most part not by different approaches to the problem" (at this point one begins to wonder in bewilderment: but what about the differences in induction and deduction and the approaches which were outlined in the first argument?). This dispute, we read further, "reflects the endeavor of some **to avoid** systematic study of **extremely complex** military-strategic subject matter... and a **willingness** of others to undertake this **painstaking and interminable** labor" (my emphasis—E.P.) (No 5, p 29).

Here, as anyone can see, the notorious dispute among political scientists is caused, it transpires, not by differences in scientific principles and methods of research but a simple division between the lazy and unscrupulous "political lyric poets" shunning difficulties and the diligent and industrious "technocrats" selflessly prepared for "painstaking and interminable" labor. This argument goes altogether beyond the framework of science, and therefore let us leave it without the attention which it would merit in some other case unrelated to science.

Were I to confine myself merely to showing the inconsistency in A. Arbatov's arguments, their contrived nature and artificiality and the unlawful division of political scientists per the characteristics which the author of the article proposes, I would not be accomplishing my mission in full. The point being that this division itself is not as inoffensive as might appear. The artificial division and counterpoise of some scientists to others and some scientific schools to others has its gnoseological, so to speak, and practical roots. I shall dwell on them briefly.

One line in A. Arbatov's arguments is perfectly clearly aimed not only at showing but also publicly deriding the barrenness, futility and pedantry which exist, in his opinion, in the studies of the "political lyric poets". Although, I would note, this is not buttressed in documentary form anywhere in the article, and all the charges are of purely rhetorical nature. In fact just look at the

inexpressible sarcasm with which he inquires: "...perhaps diplomats and the military should be allowed to deal with the 'pieces of iron' and tedious specifics, and the scholars left to decide the truly major problems: inasmuch as peace is better than war, disarmament preferable to an arms race and policy, from the security viewpoint, more important than military hardware?" (No 4, p 21).

Who are these dimwits who propose dealing with such pedantic problems, which are altogether divorced from reality? It is not difficult to guess here: they are, of course, the same "political lyric poets". It is at them that A. Arbatov hints when maintaining that, instead of "serious scientific analysis," they offer "streamlined formulas fit for all contingencies of life and handsome in their infallibility and inutility" (No 4, p 21).

He writes about them at the end of the article: "The 'political scientists,' appealing (where? when? who?—E.P.) for people not to preoccupy themselves with 'pieces of iron' and for them to be above prosaic details, are by no means helping the development of the scientific base in this sphere...." And for this reason, evidently, their "streamlined glowing sententious utterances, not suffused with objective content, frequently burst like soap bubbles when they encounter the sharp edges of military-strategic reality and negotiating practice" (No 5, p 30).

And, finally, having, evidently, exhausted his own emotion, he brands them with a quotation from Klyuchevskiy, likening therewith the "lyric poets" to "an empty vessel traveling without a genuine valuable cargo (whose vessel travels with a "genuine valuable cargo" in this case needs no explanation).

Scientific arguments and debate on any issue are understandable and close to me, if the argument is substantive and proper. But I can neither understand nor accept an argument, not an argument even but an unsubstantiated charge leveled at this scientific school or the other or anonymous scientists, scientists in general, and advanced in the guise of an argument. Disagreements and differences of opinion are natural for science, but they should be resolved with scientific arguments, and not the arrogant nonacceptance of another's views merely on the grounds of their being disliked by some people. These are extra-scientific methods in science which are no less harmful and dangerous for its development than extra-economic methods in economics.

A. Arbatov raises his voice repeatedly in the article in support of the usefulness of science and in support of it being brought closer to practice. He desires science to be useful. An excellent desire! But for it to be such it is necessary primarily to afford it an opportunity to be science, that is, to liberate it from tutelage on the part of practice, which under our conditions is nothing other than tutelage on the part of government officials and bureaucrats of various departments.

And, indeed, there is no point being specially concerned for a scientist to be useful. If he is really a scientist, and not a person on the make from science, he is the first, concerned with a search for the truth and the ascertainment of objective relationships and regularities, to discern the practical requirements of the times, when no man of practice, perhaps, is as yet even thinking of this. Only he should not be hindered and commanded. Whoever, on the other hand, wishes to impose on scientists bare practicalness, bare utility, utility of the moment, risks getting, instead of a scientist, a phrasemonger, a person pursuing his own interests or a doctrinaire. Have not too many of them been cultivated with us as it is? And all thanks to the ineradicable desire to bind science to practice by tight bonds and make it directly dependent on the latter.

Becoming in this case a simple underling of practice, science ceases to be science; practice, on the other hand, not being enriched with genuinely scientific ideas, revolves in a vicious circle of customary ideas and becomes an impediment to its own development. In turn, the utilitarian requirements and ideas born of limited practice, invading scientific and theoretical research, only falsify it. Was it not such a relationship of science and practice which we had for decades? Did it not engender malicious dogmatism on the one hand and moldiness, stagnation, inefficiency and a complete unwillingness for change on the other?

In order for science to develop and enrich practice with new ideas it is necessary to free it from direct dependence on the latter. I am convinced that only given the conscious and full implementation of this principle may science be secured that inner freedom which is a basic condition of its development. And only given such independence may science and practice profitably interact with one another and fertilize one another.

I absolutely cannot accept also the idea perfectly definitely permeating A. Arbatov's "argument" with the "lyric poets" concerning the inutility and barrenness of the ideas and research of the latter. For me this attitude toward one's scientific colleagues is a symbol of the past: it has a particular tradition not only in our comparatively recent but also distant history. The fallacious opinion that there are good and bad, useful and inutile, necessary and unnecessary sciences and that the first, together with their representatives, are deserving of praise and every encouragement, whereas the second, of censure, abolition and extirpation even, was gradually cultivated and, finally, firmly established with us. This was the case in the distant past, but was the case also in the not-too-distant past: the tradition has proven durable also in the soil of the socialism which is being built.

Such divisions of sciences into useful and inutile are ultimately a sign of the mental, moral and cultural decline of society. Such divisions have caused our science not only direct and largely irreparable losses

expressed in the defamation and extermination of scientific personnel and a lagging behind the West in most important scientific spheres but also indirect damage, having created a type of scientist in whom a readiness for and love of search for the objective truth and universal values has been killed off and who has aspired to catch merely the nuances of the subjective opinions of the "authorities" in order, employing the words of the quotation cited by A. Arbatov, to serve them somewhat more dexterously and thereby distinguish himself and who has consciously confined himself to the accomplishment of narrow practical tasks fully in accordance with the traditionally and wrongly understood role of science and "state" need.

I do not believe that A. Arbatov consciously shares these ideas and traditions. But in maintaining the existence of two "currents," two "schools" in our international policy studies, in fact counterposing them to one another, and propounding the idea of the questionable value and virtual inutility of one of these currents he is, whether he wishes this or not, in practice serving as a conduit of such ideas and introducing needless discord between closely related and mutually complementary schools of scientific research. And inasmuch as the basis of this "argument" contains, as shown above, neither substantive nor methodological grounds, the position adopted by A. Arbatov involuntarily prompts the thought that he is concerned not so much for scientific interests as a desire to establish the priority nature merely of his own school over others and to the detriment of others. Also testifying to this is, specifically, the unimportant fact that A. Arbatov attributes the sphere of his research to "true science" which does not tolerate, in his words, "verbiage, careless formulas and rash ideas" (No 5, p 30). The latter, one has to think, characterize the "political" school. However, I would note that no one, including A. Arbatov himself, is insured against careless formulas and rash ideas: I have already partially shown this, I will partially further show it below.

Now a little on A. Arbatov's specific objections to my viewpoint concerning the correlation of policy and its means. What is the essence of the dispute? I maintained in my article (MEMO No 10, 1987) that there is a close interdependence between policy and its means and that ultimately policy has primacy over means. Means are policy in action, policy being manifested in no way other than via them. If we take as such a means, for example, nuclear weapons, they are nothing other than policy in action or, if you wish, "embodied policy". "This level of arms or the other," I wrote, "is a direct effect of states' corresponding policy and political relations between them. In order, consequently, to do away with the effect it is necessary to begin with the removal of the causes giving rise to this effect. The causes, however, are always political and cannot be otherwise."

Translating this opinion into the language of metaphor, I would add that to cure this disease (social or physical) or the other we need to treat not its symptoms or effects but to treat its causes, in which the disease is concealed. Thus the arms race is a **symptom and expression** of the disease whose name is the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and the military-political groupings or states corresponding thereto intensified by ideological intolerance in respect of one another. For this reason it is necessary in order to do away with the arms race, if not to remove it altogether, to at least appreciably undermine its political foundation.

A. Arbatov believes that the "merit of the adduced syllogism is that it is utterly incontestable, but only at a very high level of generalization." Its shortcoming, on the other hand, is that, upon its practical application "a multitude of questions arises" (No 5, p 19). If one takes as a shortcoming of this syllogism or the other the fact that it gives rise to a multitude of questions, and as a merit, the fact that it does not give rise to questions, let it be as Arbatov says, although I am of a different opinion. But what are these questions? A. Arbatov believes that the direct linkage of policy with arms levels "gives rise in a number of cases not only to theoretical objections but also leads directly to an impasse from the viewpoint of practical recommendations" (No 5, p 19). What are these cases and what kind of theoretical objections may there be here? What he went on to write caused me the greatest amazement.

"In fact," he inquires, "is there between the USSR and the United States a single **political conflict** which justifies the stockpiling of approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons and the continued buildup of the potentials of destruction? Is there a single intelligible explanation of the **political facotrs** in respect of which the Warsaw Pact or NATO would resolve to attack one another? But 3 million-strong groupings of the armed forces of the two alliances, up to 80,000 tanks and approximately 6,000 attack aircraft are in confrontation on the continent" (my emphases—E.P.) (No 5, p 19).

In fact, where has all this sprung from: there are no political factors,but armed forces fantastic in terms of their quantitative and qualitative parameters confront one another? Did the words quoted above not belong to a well-known political scientist, it might have been thought that they had been written by a dilettante. I cannot imagine that A. Arbatov has let escape his attention the entire postwar history of the rigid opposition and confrontation of the two blocs and the world's militarily most powerful states at the head of them: primarily the "cold war," packed with numerous conflicts, in which both powers and both military-political groupings sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly participated (the Korean War, the Near East conflict, the Caribbean crisis, the events in Hungary, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Angola, Afghanistan, the deployment in Europe of Soviet and American missiles and so on and so forth). If all this does not pertain to political factors of the spurring of tension and, correspondingly, the arms race, to what, I venture to ask, does it pertain?

If there indeed were a division in our science between "lyric poets" and "physicists" and if the above-quoted assertion of A. Arbatov were the platform of the latter, this in itself would impel me to unhesitatingly take the side of the "lyric poets".

I would note that A. Arbatov is altogether not entirely consistent in his arguments: at one time he acknowledges the influence of political factors on the arms race, then he suddenly denies them. Evidently recognizing this entire contradictoriness, he introduces the first cause concept, by which, incidentally, he understands the "cold war" (No 5, p 21). I emphasize this specially in order that it not be thought that this term belongs to me, which might have been thought by proceeding from the logic of A. Arbatov's arguments. I speak of the political causes of the arms race, but by no means of its first cause. This is a fundamental difference. I affirm loyalty to my proposition concerning the primacy of policy over its means by the fact of the conclusion of the INF Treaty, as, equally, the negotiations which are under way on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. A. Arbatov believes that this treaty testifies, on the contrary, not in support of my proposition for the reason that "no political first causes of the arms race were preliminarily removed" (No 5, pp 20, 21).

The "first causes" were, perhaps, not removed, but many political factors impeding the conclusion of such an agreement had been removed: it was for this reason that it was concluded. Today's easing of tension in relations between the USSR and the United States and the disarmament negotiations accompanying it have basically no causes other than political. They have been embodied most fully in what we today call the new political thinking. "Only the transfer of foreign policy activity to a new system of coordinates," A. Bovin writes, "enabled the Soviet political leadership to reconsider the state of affairs and adopt the sole correct decisions—to accede to the 'zero option' in respect of the 'Euromissiles' and withdraw the forces from Afghanistan."[3] Precisely. If A. Arbatov has proof of the reverse, it would be interesting to hear it.

And, finally, I do not doubt in the least the importance and necessity of the research in which A. Arbatov is engaged. Nonetheless, I have to note that in this research military means, primarily nuclear weapons, are accorded manifestly exaggerated and at times self-sufficing significance and a role reaching at times the point of their counterpoise to policy. A. Arbatov's entire article actually testifies to this.

It is my profound belief that any distortion in the correlation of military means and policy in favor of the first (whether in theory or, even more, in practice) and any preponderance of military parameters over political, economic and cultural parameters are dangerous for the development of interstate relations. Both East and West contributed to ensuring that the military balance of forces acquired exaggerated significance in these relations, as a consequence of which there was even more of an exacerbation of the already serious contradictions and problems dividing us; a false importance has been (and continues to be) accorded modernization of the armed forces, and at the same time the opportunity of understanding what common interests unite everyone and how much worthier are efforts to coordinate differing interests than to separate them has been lost. In our day the most dangerous course of development which could possibly be imagined is the subordination of policy to the logic of the arms race, the logic of the military balance of forces, that is, the logic of the "embodied" policy of the past. All our hopes are connected with a policy which, on the contrary, subordinates to itself the menacing means, tames them and ultimately does away with them.

Policy in the process of its realization creates the means required by circumstances; but policy gets rid of these means given a change in circumstances, which change, what is more, under its influence. We see this clearly and graphically today: under circumstances which have changed thanks to the new policy what yesterday was a menacing means in the hands of policy (intermediate- and shorter-range missiles) is being converted at its wishes before the eyes of the whole world into a pile of metal, thereby ceasing to be a means. And we hope that, thanks to prudent policy, all the remaining nuclear weapons will also in time be converted into such a pile of metal, having accomplished thereby a wondrous metamorphosis—from means into non-means.

If all the arguments which I have set forth here put me, in A. Arbatov's opinion, in the "lyric poet" category, then I myself may openly declare: yes, I am a "lyric poet"!

Footnotes

1. A. Arbatov, "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms" (MEMO Nos 4, 5, 1988).

2. E. Pozdnyakov, "Relationship of Economics and Politics in Interstate Relations" (MEMO No 10, 1987).

3. IZVESTIYA, 15 June 1988.

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Need for Hard Information, Practical Application

18160003l Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 130-134

[A. Arbatov rebuttal: "Is There Really Cause for a Dispute?"]

[Text] Although my respected opponent himself describes himself as a "meticulous" individual, he has evidently overlooked one fact of considerable importance. Otherwise our debate would have been more

objective and clearly drawn. The foreword to the first of my articles in question (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDNUARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 4, 1988, p 11) speaks of two currents engaged in a polemic between themselves not among Soviet political scientists in general but in circles of "Soviet political scientists dealing with problems of international security and disarmament."

What disputes are under way in other spheres of political science is a separate discussion. In the disarmament sphere the said currents exist, and the polemic between them is frequently very acute. It unfolds more openly at practically every relatively broad scientific conference and is being conducted secretly in the press. Many names and the corresponding quotations may be recalled in confirmation of this. E. Pozdnyakov's pronouncements were quoted merely as an illustration since one school here appears in the "purest" form.

In responding to E. Pozdnyakov's letter we might, actually, have let it go at this. His militant arguments, roaming over the whole field of international-political science, fight an imaginary enemy and frequently do not reach the subject that I raise—the state of affairs in the disarmament sector of the scientific front. Frequently, but not always. He puts forward a number of opinions directly on the said subject, which prompts me to further express certain thoughts.

I agree fully that the existence of various schools in any sphere, including study of the problems of security and disarmament, is a phenomenon which is entirely natural and necessary for harmonious scientific development. But scientific polemics should reflect really different opinions and alternative approaches to problems, and not a differing level of knowledgeability and professionalism in the knowledge of this question or the other. This applies particularly to military-political problems, which are profoundly interwoven with security and disarmament subject matter. The amount of specialized knowledge needed here not entirely fitting within the framework merely of the humanities is extraordinarily great and encompasses many disciplines: historical-political, technical, military-strategic, international-legal, economic and socio-psychological.

No one is counterposing different scientific schools to one another. And all the more groundless are E. Pozdnyakov's suspicions concerning someone's attempts "to deny, abolish" and, even more, "extirpate," as he writes, some sciences for the good of others. But criticizing the "barrenness, inutility and pedantry" of certain approaches (to use his words once again) is, in my view, entirely permissible and useful.

Now about methodology. I cannot agree with the assertion of my respected colleague that in the sphere of present-day problems of security and disarmament we have a mass of "accumulated and largely generalized scientific material." This is as yet desirable rather than actual. And the point is not only that the subject of research itself is comparatively new and numbers, particularly with reference to nuclear weapons, only two or three decades of really serious scientific study. The root of the problem lies in the consequences of the long period of stagnation, when the acute shortage of accessible factual material was reflected, viewpoints differing from the official viewpoint were not encouraged and scientific publications were seen chiefly as a means of propaganda.

Information concerning the West's military policy was drawn mainly from Western sources. But in respect of the military doctrine, strategic concepts, armed forces and military programs of the Soviet Union also use was made mainly of overseas information, using which in open publications was not, it is true, allowed. The odd dozen figures, several streamlined doctrinal propositions—this was the entire sparse ration which our sources issued the science on these problems. Economists complain about the lack of an adequate statistical base in their field, but compared with specialists on security and disarmament issues they are simply "swamped" with the necessary facts and figures (which does not mean, of course, that all is well with them).

The situation in our field has recently been rapidly changing for the better, but the lacunae are still very large, and an immense amount of work remains to be done to do away with them. Glasnost in the field of foreign policy is still lagging considerably behind glasnost in the sphere of the economy and domestic policy, and questions of security, defense capability and disarmament have, in turn, been affected by glasnost least as yet among other foreign policy subjects.

Whence the preference in the present phase for the inductive method and the need for a great deal of painstaking work on the collection, systematization and analysis of a vast amount of factual information. Without this basis we cannot elaborate a substantiated scientific theory in respect of such key problems as "equal security," "balance and parity," "defensive doctrine and strategy," "reasonable sufficiency" and "military stability" and the relationship of disarmament processes at the global and regional levels, in nuclear and conventional arms and in quantitative and qualitative parameters of the military balance. Employing the deductive method right away is possible in far from all spheres of the said problems, and attempts to do this nonetheless frequently lead to incongruities and expose the yawning gap between theory and practice.

True, E. Pozdnyakov sees nothing wrong in this. He advocates science being liberated "from tutelage on the part of practice, which under our conditions is nothing other than tutelage on the part of government officials and bureaucrats of various departments." He is against the direct dependence and rigid attachment of science to practice and against the "imposition on scientists of bare

practicalness, bare utility," which make science an underling of practice, and the scientist, "a phrasemonger, a person pursuing his own interests or a doctrinaire."

Well, strongly put, but inaccurately. For our main problem (in disarmament science, in any event) amounted in the years of stagnation not to the excessive dependence of science on practice, not to excessive tutelage on the part of government officials and not to bare practicalness but precisely the opposite. That is, to science's total separation from practice. It was simple for bureaucrats and government officials to just spit on what scientists thought and wrote at that time. This was totally unrelated to the needs of practice and did not influence practical policy in the least. This applied even more, I believe, to E. Pozdnyakov's subject matter—international relations theory. This situation could not have suited better those same "government officials and bureaucrats" inasmuch as no one was able to call in question their departmental approaches to the accomplishment of practical tasks, which led our policy into serious problems and failures. And science under these conditions became at best abstract pedantry, an "exercise for the mind," and at worst, servile propaganda prepared to "scientifically" substantiate any "historic initiative" and each "wise and farsighted step".

The times are different now. The interest of the practical departments in the opinion and recommendations of scientists is unprecedentedly great. And this has nothing in common with "tutelage," "dependence" and "command," which my opponent so fears. The practical organizations are now prepared to discuss seriously and take note of the most critical and impartial opinion on the part of scientists. There can be no question of any servility. That far from all scientists are up to the high demands being made of them is another matter. Not all are capable of providing specific recommendations, from whatever theoretical heights their deductive process may condescend.

Lest I afford an excuse for criticism for the advancement of "an unsubstantiated accusation leveled at this scientific school or other or anonymous scientists," I shall try to confirm this conclusion in the example of the statements of my opponent. Let us examine the question of the cause-and-effect connection of policy, the arms race and disarmament.

E. Pozdnyakov considers the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and the military groupings of states corresponding thereto exacerbated by ideological intolerance in respect of one another the cause of the arms race, which appears as a consequence or "symptom" of the said political "disease". In order to do away with the arms race, he writes, "we need, if not to eliminate it altogether, to at least appreciably undermine its political foundation."

Analyzing such syllogisms is not easy. They truly evoke a multitude of questions, but only owing to the extremely free use of the terms "disarmament," "arms limitation," "elimination of the arms race," "pacification of the means (arms)," "destruction of the means"—all these are employed not as scientific concepts but as symbols which may be used without thought being given to their practical meaning. It is for this reason that for those who conceive of the essence of the question it is frequently difficult to understand what specifically E. Pozdnyakov has in mind. I would not like to think that it is this which he considers a merit of his syllogisms.

If by "elimination of the arms race" general and complete disarmament is understood, immeasurably more is obviously required for this than "at least, undermining" and even "doing away with" the said political causes of the arms race. A fundamental rearrangement of international relations (including the relations of the developing countries, and not only of the two socioeconomic systems), the complete abolition of the power factor, the creation of universal supranational structures of the regulation of interstate relations, a profound change in states' rights and duties and so on and so forth would be essential.

If, however, the reference is to more modest tasks and closer prospects, arms reduction and limitation could hardly be brought about by the "doing away with" or, at least, undermining" of the current division of the world into opposite systems and military-political groupings. Given this approach, neither the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in three media, other treaties of the 1960's-1970's nor the INF Treaty would have been possible. Given this formulation of the question, any agreement on limiting the arms race would have to be postponed to the indefinite future. Thank heavens, the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, on preventing a race in space-based antimissile arms, on deep cuts in the armed forces and conventional arms of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons, on the further limitation of underground nuclear testing and many other measures are not linked with the doing away with or undermining of the political realities whose elimination E. Pozdnyakov advocates. Otherwise, I fear, we would have to wait until the second coming for both arms reduction and limitation and an easing of tension and a lessening of the danger of war (I am convinced that E. Pozdnyakov sincerely advocates disarmament. But many other people, in the United States particularly, are knowingly resorting to superficial, primitive slogans of the "it is not weapons which give rise to mistrust but mistrust which gives rise to weapons" type to relegate disarmament to the background and allow neither a reduction in arms nor a lessening of mistrust).

So, apparently, we are fighting the effects without removing the causes, the symptoms, and not the disease? Yes, in a certain sense precisely so. And a contradiction

can only be seen here if we do not recognize the dialectical interaction of causes and effects, ends and means. If metaphysics are substituted for dialectics, and theory high-handedly divorced from practice.

Developing the medical metaphor of my respected colleague, I would note that his approach to the treatment of the disease, and not its symptoms, is right only within certain limits. If a person is in a pre-infarction condition, he is put in the resuscitation unit and spared a heart attack: the clot is dissolved, the heart muscle is stimulated and an emergency operation is performed even. In this situation, taking abstract theory as the basis, regaling the patient with advice concerning removal of the causes of the disease—do not drink, do not smoke, take walks in the fresh air—would be a cruel mockery. All these pious admonishments are good when the crisis is passed, when the immediate threat has been postponed or appreciably reduced. In the struggle for a reduction in arms the first important steps have already been taken, but a breakthrough has not yet arrived.

But what, for all that, permits a hope for serious arms reduction and limitation if the political causes of the military rivalry which E. Pozdnyakov cites have not been removed? The division of the world into two socioeconomic systems and two military-political alliances truly formed the basis of the postwar arms race. But in 40 years this arms race, multiplied by intensive S&T progress and the interests which took shape around it of immense military-industrial complexes, acquired apowerful intrinsic inertial force and logic of development. Primarily in the nuclear-space sphere, it has become considerably separate (although not isolated, of course) from the political conflicts which engendered it and has far outgrown states' political stakes and interests in these conflicts.

The formal logic of my opponent: causes engender effects, consequently, it is necessary initially to remove the causes, and then, the effects, might have been applicable, with reservations even then, to the prenuclear era. But it is even less suitable for the present situation than Newton's classical laws for the nuclear physics and quantum mechanics of the present day. The colossal destructive power of nuclear weapons has disrupted the traditional cause-and-effect connection of policy and military power. War has ceased to be a continuation of policy by other, forcible means, whose kill potential has outgrown states' all in any way rational political ends and made war suicidal and therefore unthinkable, regardless of the seriousness of this political conflict or the other.

But this far from exhausts the issue. War has "avenged itself" on policy for its practical unacceptability. In the past 40 years the latter has to a tremendous extent come to be subordinated to military-strategic considerations and the struggle for more advantageous geostrategic positions in regional conflicts in anticipation of a probable global confrontation (this has always been justified, of course, by the need to "deter" the other side and prevent war).

Subsequently, by way of "compensation," the arms race assumed to a large extent the functions of war as the continuation of policy by other means, that is, the arms race became the waging of war by other means. And, as is frequently the case in war, particularly total war (and the race in nuclear-space arms corresponds precisely to this), the means became an absolute, an end in themselves, prevailed over policy and began to interact in accordance with their own laws, having lost the direct connection with the political interests and ends which engendered them. Like war also, the arms race and geostrategic rivalry undermine states' economic power, exhaust them morally and psychologically and paralyze their political will. Occurring perhaps more slowly and with less bloodshed than in previous wars, but nonetheless unswervingly and under the constant press of the catastrophic nuclear danger, these processes, if not stopped, will ultimately inevitably lead to the disintegration of even the strongest powers, as the empires of Caesar, the Habeburgs, Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm collapsed in the past.

My respected colleague evidently cannot or is unwilling to see all of this. He enumerates as the political causes of the arms race the Korean War, the Near East conflict, the Caribbean crisis, the events in Hungary, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Angola, Afghanistan, the deployment in Europe of Soviet and American missiles and so on and so forth. International conflicts, particularly the Korean War, the Caribbean crisis and the events in Afghanistan influenced the arms race, of course—after all, the latter does not occur in a vacuum. These events brought about an additional (compared with what had been planned prior to then) increase in military budgets and the acceleration of a number of military programs. But, of course, these conflicts were not the cause of the arms race, nuclear particularly. Other events, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, exerted no pronounced influence on the arms race, the U.S. military budget began at that time to rapidly diminish (in the course of the winding down of the war in Vietnam) and the SALT I negotiations between the USSR and the United States were, following a certain holdup, nonetheless resumed a year later.

As far as the "deployment in Europe of Soviet and American missiles" is concerned, such an example would puzzle the dilettante and utterly confuse the specialist. After all, one does not have to be a professional to know that the deployment, that is, the fielding, of any weapons is the main phase of their development, in other words, the material embodiment and apotheosis of each cycle of the arms race. It transpires that the arms race, as my critic writes, "pertains to the political causes... of the arms race."

These examples, it would seem, testify primarily that in addition to the terminological vagueness we are encountering real theoretical confusion. This is to what "lyric poetry" is reduced when it is unhesitatingly set in train on such issues. This cannot but be regretted inasmuch as E. Pozdnyakov's previous theoretical works not devoted directly to security and disarmament had accustomed the reader to expect from him profoundly considered logical constructs, a complete absence of incidental generalizations and examples and meticulously whetted terminology.

In reality, it would seem, international conflicts, global geostrategic rivalry, the nuclear arms race, the confrontation in nuclear and conventional forces in the European theater and much else—all these are different manifestations in terms of form of the political confrontation and struggle of the two coalitions of states headed by the United States and the Soviet Union (for simplicity's sake we shall leave aside third forces for the time being). Regional conflicts primarily spur the rivalry in peripheral areas: naval forces, means of strategic mobility and others. Arms limitation measures here are impossible without removal of the political causes and the settlement of regional conflicts.

But the nuclear rivalry and the buildup of the military confrontation in Europe have become a more or less separate sphere of East-West relations expressed in a specific form and developing in accordance with specific laws. Whence the seeming irrationality of the situation in this sphere and incommensurability with political first causes and the new political conflicts arising in parallel. The arms race in the central areas has itself become a most serious source of political tension and most important conflict of states' political interests (in fact, what event on the international scene could create such a threat to your interests as the physical capability of the other power, as it chooses, to totally annihilate you as a nation and state within half an hour?). Consequently, this conflict needs to be settled directly without waiting for the removal of other political conflicts and without postponement until the "doing away with or, at least, undermining" of the political causes which my opponent makes paramount in the business of "doing away with of the arms race" (whatever is meant by this).

Progress in arms reduction and limitation is in itself the way to ease political (more precisely, military-political) tension and gradually settle this central conflict—also in an inherently specific form, that is, in the form of the corresponding treaties, verification system and so forth. The INF Treaty provided graphic confirmation of this. The journalist A. Bovin, whom my colleague quoted, is absolutely right: for accession to the "zero option" a profound rethinking of the entire approach to security and the formulation of new political thinking, and not simply a recalculation by the appropriate department of the military balance, as a result of which, instead of what was earlier deduced as NATO's double superiority in terms of delivery systems and triple superiority in terms of nuclear warheads, parity was suddenly achieved, was required.

The new attitude toward questions of security played a decisive part, and the former mechanical and narrow departmental approaches were boldly cast aside—and as a result the main breakthrough was accomplished directly in the sphere of disarmament. That is, per E. Pozdnyakov, it was decided to do away with the "symtoms" and "effects," which intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are. But in what way was what he considers the cause: the division of the world into two systems, into two military-political alliances of states done away with or undermined and what international conflicts were preliminarily settled? (The Afghanistan agreement was signed later).

In accordance with my thinking, the INF Treaty resolves the parties' political conflict in one sphere: in their military-political and military-strategic relations at the intermediate- and shorter-range missile level. The effect of this solution goes, of course, far beyond the framework of this fragment of the global political-strategic picture.

In dealing with questions of disarmament I am far from making an absolute of the significance of my subject and reducing thereto the entire problem of security and prevention of war. No less important is the settlement of regional conflicts and the creation of regional collective security systems. After all, weapons in themselves will hardly start a war, even considering the danger of technical malfunctions and unsanctioned use. The escalation of a local crisis combined with an unsteady military balance not stabilized by agreements on arms reductions and a limitation of military activity—this is the mixture which could explode and trigger a catastrophe. And recently problems of the ecology, which, in my opinion, demand an immediate start on negotiations at just as high a level and with the same degree of priority as disarmament negotiations, have inexorably been moving to the fore.

"We hope," E. Pozdnyakov writes in conclusion, "that, thanks to prudent policy, all the remaining nuclear weapons will in turn also be converted into the same pile of metal, having accomplished thereby a wondrous metamorphosis from means into non-means." The major key of this finale very much raises the vital tone, of course. So I would like to take up the words of a song which was once popular: "How fine it would then be living in the world, let us be friends forever, boys!" I and those who think as I do, incidentally, the so-called "physicists" or "technics" (although these relative names are unfortunate, perhaps), also hope that the disarmament process will develop progressively. The whole question is how to secure this in reality, how science and theory may help practice.

The sinister destructive arsenals will not, I fear, crumble into dust from fervent slogans, as in the fable, when the hero's magic words overwhelm the evil spells. On the contrary, these arsenals will continue to grow, however much one exposes the political causes at the basis thereof. And those who are directly involved in the multiplication of the lethal potentials will go about their business mocking the "lyric poets" and rejoicing that they are not encountering less exalted, but more objective and professionally substantiated counterarguments.

One can say "sugar" ten times, but this does not make one's mouth sweet. One can utter "political approach" as many times as one likes, but it remains a fine phrase until expressed in categories of ceilings and limits of arms reduction and limitation, alternative levels and structures of armed forces and prudent strategic concepts.

In life, unfortunately, "wondrous metamorphoses" are an extremely rare phenomenon. Instead of this, there is hard work, interminable struggle and difficult dilemmas. Success is always of a compromise nature, and the accomplishment of immediate tasks confronts us with new problems. The arms race is by no means a passive subject of negotiations but a highly dynamic phenomenon actively adapting to agreements, getting round them by flanking maneuvers and seeking out any loophole in order to outpace and emasculate the disarmament process. Dismantling the destructive arsenals is essential, but this needs to be done with a knowledge of their structure, laws of development, reserves of strength of their supports and the location of weak joints. Otherwise, in removing some parts one will cause a dangerous tilt in another direction or bring down upon oneself the whole caboodle.

Lyric poetry has a right to exist, of course, and if my respected colleague declares: yes, I am a "lyric poet," no one would dare reproach him for this. But "lyric poetry" and science have (in the sphere of security and disarmament, in any event) different ends and methods, and the audience is different also. The main thing is not to confuse the genres, there will then be fewer reasons for disagreements.

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Possible Destabilizing Consequences of Total Nuclear Disarmament

Advantage for Violation of Ban

18160003i Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 121-122

[Letter from I.O. Polyakov: "Would a Post-Nuclear World Be Stable?"]

[Text] Dear Comrade Editor,

This note is most likely the result of perplexity, for which our press is partly to blame. It is hard to believe that no one has studied the simple mechanism of strategic instability at issue. However, in the domestic literature available to me there are not the least signs of doubt as to the incontestable beneficence of immediate and complete nuclear disarmament. This letter is for me the sole possibility of ascertaining the true state of affairs. I hope that this brief note indicating the main flaws of the arguments which have been adduced will not burden your advisers unduly.

Examined below is an aspect of the problem, which has become topical recently, of the conclusive elimination of nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe, evidently, that a simplistic interpretation of the nuclear disarmament concept admits of criticism, whose possible arguments should be either taken into consideration or refuted. Decisions in this sphere should exclude all versions of a development of events which would mean a destabilization of the world situation. This is an essential and very strong requirement. The numerous merits of a specific plan of disarmament are meaningless if, given its realization, there arises the possibility if only of a single scenario of a victorious war being unleashed.

Such a possibility could arise given achievement of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. We would note that we have in mind genuine disarmament backed up by the proper verification. A switch under these conditions to the rebuilding of nuclear potential and its use would afford an aggressor decisive advantages.

We would point to circumstances confirming the justice of this claim. A most precise plan of the rebuilding of nuclear arms is possible for an aggressor. The vast experience of foregoing development would spare him the uncertainty and lack of confidence of the first years of the nuclear era. The use of newly acquired nuclear potential against an enemy's most important targets (the bombing of nuclear industry enterprises, space-flight centers and so forth) would ensure victory in a race for restoration of nuclear power, even if the other side had time to react. Attempts at resistance on the part of conventional armed forces under the conditions of an enemy's rapidly growing nuclear power would be hopeless. We would note that the existence of a developed monitoring system created for the purpose of disarmament and the exhaustive information obtained thereby would be conducive to the success of the attacking side. Also important is the fact that the use of nuclear weapons could be kept to the minimum necessary for preventing restoration of the opposite side's nuclear potential. That is, there would be a real possibility of a truly limited victorious nuclear war not involving an inevitable ecological catastrophe.

International supervision is not an insurmountable obstacle for a possible aggressor. A far more important goal than achieving the secrecy of operations would

appear to be the securing of a maximum rate of deployment of nuclear weapons and the exclusion of pauses in the engineering processes of the production of munitions and their immediate use against the facilities of an enemy participating or capable of participating in a race to rebuild nuclear potentials.

The strategic situation of a post-nuclear world would incite preventive actions as the sole possibility of avoiding defeat. Analogous strategic instability is known from study of the consequences of deployment of broad-based ABM systems.

Let us formulate the main conclusions:

A post-nuclear world would be unstable since victory in a new round of the nuclear arms race could secure for an aggressor decisive military advantages. In addition, for some parties to the agreement general and complete nuclear disarmament could be merely a component of a plan whose ultimate goal is the achievement of victory on the battlefield.

A truly stable nuclear-free world is possible given an appreciable limitation of the sovereignty of all states without exception and given the existence of an effective international body, a world government, possibly, capable of actually limiting the actions of national governments in their own countries.

What follows from the said arguments?

At the present time, when all countries of the world react very painfully to any encroachments on their sovereignty, the tenable political goal may be not conclusive nuclear disarmament but the creation of the most stable, "impasse" strategic situation. This may evidently be achieved by the creation of symmetrical forces with a simple structure and reduced counterforce possibilities.

The minimum scale of such forces is determined on the one hand by the maximum quantity of nuclear weapons concealable from inspection and, on the other, the maximum possibilities of the creation of new arms upon one party's sudden withdrawal from the limitations mode, until such an act is detected. Obviously, the size of such forces is the less, the more effective the supervision. It is no less obvious that the necessary quantity would constitute a very small proportion of modern arsenals, and the simplification of the mission and the reduced demands on the combat readiness of the nuclear forces would make it possible to ensure far sounder guarantees than at the present time against the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

Conclusive nuclear disarmament is a task of the more distant future and is connected with a radical change in the political structure of the world.

Thanks in anticipation,

I.O. Polyakov (Chernovtsy).

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"Mirovaya ekonomi' i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

Conventional Should Accompany Nuclear Arms Limitation

18160003j Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 122-124

[Article by Anatoliy Viktorovich Rassadin, senior scientific associate of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "There Are Grounds for Cautious Optimism"]

[Text] Responding to this interesting letter, it should be mentioned right away that the problem raised by the author is extremely complex in both the practical and theoretical planes. It is essentially a question of the extent to which a "breach" in the settled political thinking confined to the traditional idea of "nuclear deterrence" is possible. The main argument of the supporters of this concept is a world without global military cataclysms achieved as a result of a "stalemate" strategic situation associated with the appearance and buildup of the potential of nuclear weapons. The acquisition by the United States and the USSR of the possibility of mutual assured destruction serves, it is believed, virtually as the sole and principal obstacle to any possible aggression within the framework of East-West relations.

It would seem that the total denial of the "contribution" of nuclear weapons and strategic parity between the USSR and the United States to the current stability at the strategic level would be wrong. Wrong since this development of the military-strategic situation has been dictated by its logic and the conscious use and upgrading of the nuclear component for the purpose of preventing the possibility of one side's acquisition of military superiority. A paradoxical situation wherein the assignment of guarantor of peace has been entrusted to a most dangerous source of the arms race has taken shape. With the growth of its destructive potential and the appearance under the influence of the S&T revolution of real possibilities of a destabilization of the situation and also in line with the sober recognition of all the possible consequences of a nuclear catastrophe has come also an understanding of the utter futility of the search for security in this direction. Thus the "nuclear deterrence" concept has entered into insoluble contradiction with military-engineering development even.

It is important, it would seem, for an understanding of the current situation to ask the following question: what is the ultimate goal of policy and of which processes of world development is it a sum total?

If it continues to reflect the stereotypes of the long period of confrontation, when the rule in relations between states was the use of power pressure and when the competition of the two social systems has developed primarily into dangerous military rivalry, in this case the "nuclear deterrence" concept could, like any other security concept in the past built on the permissibility of the use of military force, continue to be of significance for some time to come, right up to the ultimately inevitable fatal finale.

If, on the other hand, the modern world is seen in all its most intricate relationships and dependencies which have encompassed practically all spheres of human activity, it becomes clear that the endeavor to entrust only to military power and its most destructive nuclear component the role of "stabilizer" of the entire system of international relations is quite a hopeless exercise. For this reason, as practice shows, ever increasing significance in the solution of current problems of world development is attached to political and economic methods of the settlement of contentious issues.

In studying the purely military aspect of the balance of forces and the impact thereon of the disarmament process in the strategic arms sphere we should emphasize once again the extreme importance of the questions enumerated by the author inasmuch as the problem of the creation of a nuclear-free world is in fact appropriate for the building of a new all-embracing system of international security, without which nuclear disarmament is hardly practicable. This will undoubtedly be a lengthy process, and an acceleration of its ultimate solution without the creation of the appropriate conditions can hardly be considered possible. This means primarily that together with the destruction of the stockpiled weapons of this type the creation of a permanent international mechanism of collective responsibility for the cause of peace qualitatively superior in terms of the dependability of guarantees to all that has existed hitherto is contemplated. For this reason it is perfectly obvious that, guided by the principle of equal security, agreeing to the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons only of the USSR and the United States is not possible. The other nuclear powers also will at a particular stage have to join in the negotiations. The elaboration of additional specific measures to step up verification of compliance with the practice of nuclear nonproliferation, whose significance increases sharply as the denuclearization process in the military sphere develops, will be essential also.

Much attention is paid perfectly justifiably in Comrade Polyakov's arguments to a most important component ensuring compliance with the agreements which have been reached both directly in the process of the elimination of the weapons and in the subsequent period—verification measures. The Soviet-American INF Treaty demonstrates convincingly enough the parties' confidence in the possibility and effectiveness of such verification not only of the destruction of available weapons but also, which it is very important to note in connection with the misgivings of the author of the letter, directly of the industrial facilities capable of creating such systems. It should be stressed that the formula of verification involving on-site inspection which was worked out at the negotiations affords extensive opportunities for the refinement and development of such measures. This will undoubtedly be necessary as the entire process of disarmament becomes more complex and expands geographically.

As far as the author's proposition concerning the appearance of a "real possibility of a truly limited, victorious nuclear war not involving inevitable ecological catastrophe" is concerned, it is, in my view, inapplicable both at the present time and in the future not only in respect of this hypothetical "limited nuclear war" but also under the conditions of more or less large-scale military operations on the territory of highly developed countries with the use of conventional arms even. For example, it has been fully proved that fighting a war with "conventional weapons" in Europe, considering the inevitable destruction of nuclear power stations, chemical enterprises, dams and so forth, would in fact be just as ecologically unacceptable as with the use of nuclear weapons.

Nor should it be forgotten that progress in the military-engineering field is rapidly "pulling up" the destructive potential of conventional toward nuclear arms. This fact most emphatically puts on the agenda the question of a halt to the arms race in this area also.

Nuclear weapons are the "great leveler," as H. Kissinger once called them. For this reason their destruction will inevitably entail the emergence of new problems connected with the balance of forces and a certain asymmetry at nonnuclear levels. The linkage of nuclear disarmament and the negotiations on conventional arms is obvious, which, of course, introduces additional difficulties to the cardinal and rapid accomplishment of a priority task. Possible progress at the negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe should serve as an accelerator of the process of the creation of a nuclear-free world and establish the basic principles of a new system of security.

It would seem that all that has been said is to a large extent an answer to the question concerning the stability of the "post-nuclear world". It may be achieved only by a set of measures encompassing all aspects of security, and, what is more, the solution of contradictions and the formulation of common approaches and criteria for a correlation of forces in the nonnuclear sphere should be undertaken in parallel with or ahead even of the process of nuclear disarmament. In fact this means a radical change and impovement in the entire structure and atmosphere of international relations.

The process of negotiations which has begun at the present time is geared not only to a reduction in the means of armed struggle which are already stockpiled but also to erecting effective barriers in the way of new

twists of the spiral of the arms race and its breakout into space. This may be achieved with measures to impart a defensive nature to the doctrines of the opposed blocs and the building of armed forces on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

This is the point of the proposals of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament in the nuclear and nonnuclear spheres and the new Soviet concept of international security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress and developed subsequently.

We are witnessing profound objective changes encompassing all spheres of international relations and making the world tightly interdependent in the political, economic, military and other spheres. In solving the problems of this interdependent world, which in an ever multiplying number are assuming a global nature, the use of military force with inevitable, essentially fatal consequences becomes insane. Thus its significance, which was predominant in the recent past even, is diminishing increasingly, which is grounds for quite justified, albeit cautious, optimism in respect of the stability of the post-nuclear world.

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Crucial Role of West Germany in Arms Issues Stressed

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[Article by Prof Margarita Matveyevna Maksimova, doctor of economic sciences and chief scientific associate of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Revealing the Potential of Cooperation"]

[Excerpts]

FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl will visit the USSR this month. In this connection we continue the publication of material concerning various aspects of the FRG's development (see also Yu. Yudanov, "The FRG in the Latter Half of the 1980's—Basic Problems and the Search for Their Solution"—MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 9, 1988). The section begins with an article by M. Maksimova, in which the author expresses her viewpoint on the paths of development of Soviet-West German relations.

The postwar history of Soviet-West German relations is far from straightforward. There have been therein surges and upturns, the most important of which was the signing of the 1971 Moscow Treaty, which laid the foundations for the peaceful cohabitation of the peoples of the two countries. But there have also been, unfortunately, periods of stagnation, deceleration of cooperation and, at times, a winding down of contacts also.

The political barometer of the relations of the USSR and the FRG reflects quite accurately changes in the overall climate of East-West relations and in the international situation as a whole. But the state of international affairs also, in Europe particularly, is determined to a considerable extent by the level and quality of the interaction of such countries as the Soviet Union and the FRG.

Turning to the present and attempting to look into the future, we inevitably encounter the question of what lies in store for Soviet-West German relations. Will they remain in the Procrustean bed of traditional notions concerning the strict limits of the contacts of states with opposite social systems? Or will a different concept prevail—that of advancing emphatically, granted social differences, along the path of a deepening of trust, a rapprochement of the peoples of the two states, joint quest for effective ways of solving urgent international problems and transition to profound forms of relations, contacts and interaction between the governments, the business world, political and public organizations and simply the citizens of the two countries?

It would seem that it is such an approach which corresponds to the spirit of the times. It has been dictated by the unique nature of the military-political, economic and ecological situation in Europe and the world as a whole, the movement to the fore of values and interests common to all mankind and the urgent need for the renovation of the entire system of international relations. Practical prerequisites are taking shape also for the gradual transition to a new level of development of Soviet-West German relations.

The significance of the FRG in the Soviet Union's European policy will, we profoundly believe, objectively increase. This is connected primarily with the fact that in the future the FRG will reserve for itself first place in West Europe and third place in the capitalist world after the United States and Japan in terms of level of economic and S&T potential. And although in recent years the West German economy has been noticeably inferior to that of the United States and Japan in growth rate, the FRG has retained its main advantage—its high level of competitiveness on world markets. Having invested in the last year alone more than DM50 billion in the development of research and new technology, it has been ahead of other countries in terms of level of spending on R&D per capita. Together with the intensive structural reorganization of the economy, this has enabled it to move into first place in the world in terms of the scale of exports. The FRG will evidently in the immediate future also remain our leading trading partner among the capitalist countries.

The FRG's position in the North Atlantic alliance is changing. The new situation which is taking shape in the world in connection with the INF Treaty, the Soviet-American strategic offensive arms talks and the prospects of a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe affects the defense interests of the FRG to a considerably greater extent than the other European NATO participants. There is therefore reason to believe that under the changed conditions there will be a sharp increase in the FRG's role in the shaping of the future policy of this organization. The appointment as NATO secretary general of former FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner is a highly significant symptom in this respect. [passage omitted]

The domestic political alignment of forces should be put among the particular features distinguishing the FRG among Western countries. It is distinguished, first, by the uniqueness of the government coalition, within the framework of which the political course of the leading conservative party—the CDU/CSU—is constantly subject to correction on the part of its junior partner—the FDP—which occupies a more realistic position in international affairs. Second, the presence of a strong opposition in the shape of the influential Social Democratic Party, which plays a leading part in the Socialist International. Third, the powerful antinuclear and also ecology (the Green Party) movements, which have supporters in the CDU/CSU and FDP ruling parties also, and well-organized unions.

The perestroyka and democratization in the USSR, the Soviet peace initiatives and the Soviet-American accords and summits have exerted a strong influence on the political situation in the FRG, set in motion significant masses of the West German population and forced the ruling leaders to reconsider former conservative hardline positions on a number of aspects of military and foreign policy.

There has been a certain change in the FRG's official position on questions of arms reductions and the monitoring of disarmament. As is known, the H. Kohl government performed a positive role in preparation of the INF Treaty, supports plans for a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms and is expressing the intention of joining actively in the negotiations on conventional arms. West German political leaders support a settlement of regional conflicts by political means.

Bonn's estimates of the Soviet Union are changing also. For many decades the FRG had stubbornly clung to the decrepit idea of the need to weaken the USSR economically and thereby undermine its military potential and international positions also. It is now coming to understand that it is in the fundamental interests of the FRG itself, as, incidentally, of the entire rest of the West also, to have in the shape of the USSR not an illusorily weak enemy but an actual strong partner. It is immeasurably more beneficial and, what is most important, safer dealing with such a partner. It is more open to the outside world, its behavior is more predictable and fundamentally new opportunities are afforded in alliance with it for an outlet onto the important Soviet market and the development of wide-ranging economic relations and for the joint search for constructive ways of guaranteeing dependable mutual security.

Recently FRG ruling circles, including their conservatives representatives also (R. Strauss, H. Kohl), have put forward a number of initiatives pertaining to the development of relations with the Soviet Union. For several months Moscow has literally been "under attack" from prominent West German politicians. The FRG, like our country also, attaches great significance to the exchange of visits of FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Of course, the change in the FRG's foreign policy has shown itself as yet merely as a trend. It is taking shape in an acute struggle between progressive and rightwing, including revanchist, forces, with Bonn constantly looking over its shoulder at the United States and the other main NATO allies. It is well known that out of specific and other considerations certain circles in the West are by no means interested in an accelerated development of Soviet-West German relations which goes beyond the existing framework.

Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious that it is in the interests of the USSR and the FRG, and the entire international community also, not only to consolidate the positive changes which have come to light in Soviet-West German relations, specifically concerning the greater readiness of the FRG than its Western allies for constructive dialogue with the USSR, but also to reveal as far as possible the available potential of cooperation. This will require the appropriate initiatives on our part also, in whose formulation scientific forces could be enlisted.

The disarmament process. As a whole, a unique situation has been taking shape in the FRG following the signing of the INF Treaty. Whereas its government officially continues to adhere to the NATO concept of nuclear deterrence and flexible response strategy, advocates the preservation of tactical missiles and the French "nuclear cover" and so forth, considerable numbers of the population are demanding the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. The Social Democratic Party here, according to the platform adopted on 19 April of this year, has in practice supported all the Soviet initiatives in the disarmament field.

The SPD has moved forward in the elaboration of a defensive doctrine based on the principles of sufficiency; it has presented specific proposals concerning a change in the structure of the Bundeswehr and the country's naval and air forces; and a reduction in and reorganization of the structure of the FRG military budget for the 1990's. An in-depth study of the principles and stages of

the creation in Central Europe of a nuclear-free corridor, zones free of chemical weapons and confidence zones is being conducted. Considering the complexity of the practical realization of the said plans, the SPD has proposed the establishment of a transitional period, in which the West would change its strategy of deterrence to one of general security.

The Soviet peace offensive program and the quite precise reference points of a cardinal restructuring of the conceptual principles of FRG military policy proposed by the SPD are encounering the broad support of the West German public. It sees them as a practicable way of countering the large-scale modernization of weapons which is under way in NATO and the danger of a new slide toward escalation of the arms race connected with this.

At the same time we should hardly ignore the criticism on the part of peaceable forces of the FRG of our military. This concerns, in particular, the need for the speediest elaboration of the criteria, principles and content of Soviet nonoffensive doctrine and specific proposals concerning a reorganization of the structure of the armed forces and arms of the Warsaw Pact countries and glasnost in questions of military programs.

We cannot agree with all the critics' arguments, but it is obvious that vigorous efforts in this area on the part of our military departments could put the corresponding pressure on NATO generals and accelerate a reciprocal search for alternative solutions. It would seem expedient in the interests of development of the disarmament process to make more active use of the FRG's antinuclear potential and the growing popularity in the country of the idea of defensive strategy and the need for a qualitative reorganization of the structure of arms and armed forces and their reduction to a level of sufficiency.

A broadening of contacts between the military departments and staffs of the two countries, representatives of various arms of the service, including the rank and file, and between members of parliament and government experts on military issues would evidently correspond to these goals. There has, incidentally, long been a need for the creation of a military commission in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The creation also of joint study groups with the FRG from the ranks of international affairs scholars with the enlistment of military experts could be one measure. The purpose of these groups would be a comparison of existing and the development of new concepts pertaining to a wide spectrum of disarmament problems. The results of the studies could be of the nature of open joint publications and also material specially earmarked for the governments of the two countries. [passage omitted]

Problems of the Study of the FRG and the "German Question" [passage omitted] As far as relations between the FRG and the GDR are concerned, Soviet international affairs experts are manifestly in arrears here to the scientific community and our foreign policy practice. Yet an analysis of the profound changes which are occurring in the leadership of the leading West German parties, and in the FRG Government itself, in respect of the so-called "German question" merits attention, in our view. They are no longer advocating a revision of the borders, as was the case recently and as from this reactionary representatives of the "exiles from the homeland" are still unwilling to desist. The change of generations in the FRG, the recognition by increasingly broad strata of the population of the irreparability of the consequences of the outbreak of any military conflict in Central Europe, their profound understanding of the need to preserve the status quo in questions concerning state borders in Europe—all these are new realities which have to be taken into account.

The defensive doctrine, the elimination of foreign bases and other initiatives which we propose cannot, naturally, fail to exert an influence on the future development of the two German states and relations between them. In which direction? It is this that has to be studied. As a whole, however, there is evidently an acute need for unification of the scattered efforts of Germany scholars, the organization of the close coordination of research and the joint elaboration of the most contentious and topical aspects of a scientific direction. [passage omitted]

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